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Abstract 
 
Human movement is a ubiquitous behaviour that is performed to achieve goals by 
affecting changes in the outside world. The creation of the manmade environment has 
depended on our ability to plan, execute and monitor movements. This thesis will 
investigate the subjective experience and underlying brain processes that accompany 
voluntary and outcome-directed actions. 
Experiments in this work will make use of an established paradigm to quantify and 
compare participants’ perceptions of their own actions. Specifically, through the use of a 
rotating clock, participants report when they perceived action-relevant events to occur, 
such as the intention to act, the action itself, or the outcome produced by the action. 
The experience of producing an action, even in the absence of a desired outcome, varies 
among populations. This thesis will compare the experience of volition in patients with 
Parkinson’s disease and in healthy controls. It will be seen that manipulation of 
dopamine availability, either through medication or deep brain stimulation, influences 
the subjective experience of making an action. Using EEG, it will be seen that differences 
in the experience of volition are associated with the time-course of activation in brain 
areas typically related to movement initiation. 
The sense of agency, a feeling of control of over one’s own actions and their outcomes, 
will also be investigated by combining the paradigm described above with an 
established decision-making task. Results from a series of experiments will reveal a 
sequential effect in which an implicit measure of the sense of agency (intentional 
binding) is stronger following actions that produce negative outcomes. Finally, this 
novel effect, which appears to be related to learning processes, will be subjected to 
meta-analysis. 
The results obtained in this work will inform further research into volition, motor-
control and movement-related pathology. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Perpetual motion. 
 
Human movement is constant. Like all ambulant organisms, we do not stop moving, 
even when at rest. Consider the innumerable processes required for you to be able to sit 
and read this document. You are engaged in keeping your body upright and balanced. 
You may shift yourself for comfort. You may scratch an itch. You are semi-automatically 
moving your eyes across the pages, which you are deliberately turning with your hands. 
You are blinking. You are breathing. 
Even within this limited context, the extent and variety of movements is staggering. 
Many of these movements, such as breathing, blinking and sneezing, will occur without 
you being aware of any specific decision to make them happen. Some are reflexes. Other 
movements will occur seemingly as a result of an intervention or decision on ‘your’ part. 
When you turn the pages, glance at your wristwatch or reach for a mug of coffee, you 
are performing what are generally considered voluntary actions. In purely mechanical 
terms, there is no reason why these different classes of movement should be 
phenomenologically distinct. The muscular activity for voluntary and involuntary 
movements can be identical, yet we experience them very differently because of the 
types of stimulation that give rise to them and the underlying brain processes that 
accompany them. 
The subjective experiences that we associate with voluntary actions will be the primary 
focus of this thesis. 
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1.2. Voluntary actions 
 
1.2.1 Definitions and focus 
 
An empirical study of voluntary action requires careful definitions. Unlike for 
temperature and weight, we have no standardized measurements for phenomena like 
intent, will or control. Furthermore, everyday descriptions of these experiences are 
shaped by societal factors like religion, law and language. 
For the purposes of this thesis, two specific aspects of voluntary action will be 
considered separately: volition, the intention to act, which precedes the physical 
movement (see section 1.3.), and agency, the feeling of control over one’s actions and 
their resulting effects (see section 1.4.). 
1.2.2. What are voluntary actions for? 
 
Voluntary actions come at a temporal and energetic cost. Deliberation and goal-directed 
planning takes time, even for simple gestures. Reflexes and habitual actions are faster, 
but are also inflexible and sometimes inappropriate to specific contexts (Keremati, 
Dezfouli, & Piray, 2011). The capacity to delay or alter certain kinds of actions may 
therefore prove beneficial to organisms that operate within a complex environment. 
Voluntary actions may also help us to develop a sophisticated understanding of the 
environments we inhabit and how to achieve goals and obtain rewards in shifting 
contexts. Indeed, many paradigms in experimental psychology assume and rely on the 
voluntary action system to investigate learning in unstable choice environments (see 
for example Rolls, 2000; Cools, Clark Owen, & Robbins, 2002). On one view, the 
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voluntariness of an action simply refers to the relatively sophisticated way it is adapted 
to context and environment (Schüür & Haggard, 2011). 
Perhaps one of the clearest indicators of the importance of voluntary action is the 
psychopathology that often accompanies its absence or disruption. 
1.2.3. Absent or disordered voluntary actions 
 
Movement paralysis is invariably distressing. The inability to move represents the 
inability to pursue goals effectively and efficiently. Particular discomfort may also arise 
from the disruption of movements that are used to communicate, such as facial 
expression and gesturing (Coulson, O’Dwyer, Adams, & Croxson, 2004). This type of 
disruption may be equally disturbing for observers and interlocutors who rely on the 
perception of such movements to interpret the thoughts and feelings of others. The 
social interactions of schizophrenic patients with flat affect, for example, are typically 
impaired relative to healthy controls (Gur et al., 2006). 
Disturbances of the voluntary movement system are a key symptom of several 
pathologies, including Parkinson’s disease, Huntington’s chorea, dystonia and 
Tourette’s syndrome. In Tourette’s syndrome, for example, involuntary movements 
(tics) may be chronic and impair everyday function. In such cases medication is often 
prescribed. Yet even mild tics require family support, environment restructuring and 
on-going therapy (Kurlan, 1997). The impact of impaired voluntary movement is a 
critical contributor to recommended measures of health-related quality of life, for 
example in Parkinson’s disease (Martinez-Martin, Rodriguez-Blazquez, Kurtis, & 
Chaudhuri, 2011) and recovery of voluntary movement is considered a priority 
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treatment in recovery from brain damage, for example in stroke patients (Turton & 
Fraser, 1986).  
Disturbances in voluntary movement may also arise from the presence of an involuntary 
movement, rather than loss of volition. The Kohnstamm phenomenon, for example, 
describes the feeling of ‘floating arms’ after prolonged isometric engagement of the 
deltoid muscle against a resistant surface (Kohnstamm, 1915). The effect is short-lived 
(less than a minute), not functionally disruptive and therefore not normally experienced 
as distressing. However, the phenomenon is sufficiently unfamiliar to be considered a 
curious departure from our experience of voluntary movement and has been a subject 
of investigation for more than 100 years (De Havas, Ghosh, Gomi, & Haggard, 2016). 
Examples such as this strongly suggest that that our default experience of movement 
incorporates voluntariness. The absence of volition or the presence of involuntary 
movements is generally experienced as strange and considered pathological.  
1.2.4. Investigating voluntary movements – aims and motivation 
 
Given the importance of voluntary movement, it is perhaps unsurprising that it has long 
been a topic of scientific enquiry. These investigations have done more than just satisfy 
intellectual curiosity. Understanding how voluntary movements arise has been critical 
to the development of movement disorder therapies and pharmacological interventions. 
These interventions enable people to achieve objectives, when their ability to do so has 
become compromised. 
In very different circumstances, the study of movement may also be useful in protecting 
those who lack control over their actions. Legal systems make an important distinction 
between criminal actions that were performed with or without volition on the part of 
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the accused. When commission of the act itself is not contested, sentencing typically 
depends on whether or not the accused knew what they were doing, and understood 
the consequences of their actions (mens rea, in legal terms). If this cognitive 
‘appreciation’ of the crime is absent, a defence of insanity may be considered (Ogloff, 
1991; Garrison, 1998). Regrettably, it has been shown in mock juror group studies that 
understanding the extent and application of formal guidelines (e.g. the M’Naughton 
rules or the ALI rule) differs significantly between individuals (Ogloff, 1991). In cases 
where subjective judgements are required, individual differences in conceptual 
understanding may influence decisions. The use of objective criteria would therefore be 
preferred, particularly in high-stakes contexts, such as criminal law. A more 
comprehensive understanding of the quantifiable aspects of voluntary movements is 
therefore desirable. 
1.2.5. Investigating voluntary movements – methodology 
 
The study of voluntary movement was historically associated with the description and 
treatment of movement disorders. This tradition dates back at least to Galen in his work 
‘de Tremore’ [trad: on tremors] (Louis, 2000). In even earlier texts, frequent mention of 
possession by malicious spirits, spasms, fits and seizures suggests that disturbances in 
voluntary action were noted and studied at least as far back as there are written records.  
In the absence of disordered movement, empirical investigation of the mechanisms 
underlying voluntary actions was for many centuries undermined by religious beliefs in 
a soul, or similar concepts. Widespread dualism presupposed that a non-physical aspect 
of the self made decisions about actions and caused them to manifest. However, the 
operation of the central nervous system, including the motor system, has been the 
subject of speculation and experimentation since antiquity (Finger, 2001). It is the 
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subjective experience accompanying voluntary movements that was considered a subject 
for philosophers and theologians until the emergence of a scientific psychology.  
William James, in Principles (James, 1890) makes a very clear distinction between 
reflexes or automatic movements, which are “unforeseen” by the agent, and actions that 
are “desired and intended” (p. 486). James places a particular emphasis on the 
prediction of the sensory consequences of one’s action (with particular reference to 
visual input). This approach may be considered a precursor to the internal model 
principle (Francis & Wonham, 1976), according to which the central nervous system 
(CNS) makes a prediction about the result of a voluntary action, which is compared to 
the sensory result to provide feedback to the system. In this sense, as early as the 19th 
century there were attempts to understand the experience of performing an action and 
then monitoring its consequences.  
These early conceptual frameworks were later combined with the emerging 
psychophysical methods developed to quantify and measure aspects of voluntary action 
such as reaction time (Galton, 1889). Experimental work would continue in the 
psychophysical tradition to examine related variables such as force exertion (Stevens & 
Mack, 1959), and time perception (Libet et al., 1983).  
Attempts to better describe and understand the mechanisms underlying voluntary 
action have also been assisted by improved technology for studying the structure and 
function of the brain. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) has facilitated the 
comparison of voluntary and involuntary movements in a controlled setting (see for 
example Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Electroencephalography (EEG) has 
enabled a more precise examination of the temporal components of brain activity 
preceding a voluntary action (Libet, et al., 1983), while experiments using fMRI have 
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provided more fine-grained spatial descriptions of neuronal activity in a non-surgical 
setting (Lotze et al., 1999). Specific experimental paradigms relevant to volition and 
agency are described below. 
1.2.6. Aims of this thesis 
 
Despite much progress, scientific understanding of the subjective experience that 
accompanies voluntary actions is far from comprehensive.  
Patient groups with disordered movement may experience a markedly different neural 
context in which their actions occur. Specific brain sites may be damaged (as in stroke), 
or neurotransmission may be impaired (as in Parkinsons’s disease). Yet the effect these 
altered contexts have on the subjective experience of voluntary actions is not well 
defined beyond what patients themselves report.  
Furthermore, many of the established paradigms for studying voluntary action rely on 
repetitive movements with very little incentive or meaning attached to them. Few 
studies have attempted to design more ecologically valid experiments that might better 
reflect the usual context in which voluntary actions are made. 
This thesis will attempt to address these issues, using established and novel paradigms 
to investigate two aspects of voluntary action: volition and agency, in health and disease. 
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1.3. Introducing volition 
 
1.3.1 Volition and free will. 
 
Volition, or the intention to act, is an intuitively familiar experience, yet its specifics 
remain a source of debate among philosophers, artists and scientists (Roskies, 2010). 
Written records show that some early Greek philosophers, notably early Materialists 
such as Epicurus, attempted to describe the worldly origins of human action without 
recourse to ‘divine influence’ (Bobzien, 2000).  
The concept of ‘free will’ is not directly addressed in this thesis. All experiments 
presented here presuppose that volition arises as part of a deterministic process of 
causes and effects within the brain.  
1.3.2. What volition isn’t. 
 
It is unusual to speak about volition for reflexes and automatic bodily functions. 
Breathing, blinking, and sneezing are common examples of actions that seem to happen 
without any effortful or conscious intervention. Even movements that are typically 
deliberate, such as raising the leg or arm, may be induced by percussion or other kinds 
of external stimulation, such as an imperative ‘go’ signal in an experimental context. The 
less a movement can be derived from a single, immediate sensory cause, the more likely 
it seems to be described as voluntary. This aspect of volition has neatly been referred to 
as a “freedom from immediacy” (Shadlen & Gold, 2004).  
Following from this tradition, volition in the current work is taken to be an endogenous 
intention to perform some action. Endogenous in this case meaning that it arises 
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without the direct and temporally contiguous influence of an identifiable external 
stimulus.  
A further important distinction must be made between volition, as described above, and 
‘agency’ which will be introduced separately. Experiments investigating agency will 
consider the entire subjective experience of producing an action, including execution of 
the movement and monitoring its subsequent effects. Volition here will be restricted to 
the intention to act, leading up to the moment of action execution.  
1.3.3. Studying volition – practical considerations 
 
The study of volition through observations of behaviour presents a critical design 
challenge. To provide useful data, participants must respond in some way to the 
experimental environment, usually by producing an action. In many experimental 
paradigms, an explicit instruction or “go-cue” is provided. However this method of 
prompting an immediate action is not compatible with volition as described here. 
Actions must be elicited without compromising the endogenous character of the 
intention to act. Participants must feel that they are free to act whenever they choose. 
Immediate, punctate stimulus cues are thus considered unsuitable.  
One solution to the problem of eliciting actions without a specific go-signal is through 
the use of partly-directed actions. In such paradigms, the participant is given explicit 
instructions to produce an action at a time of their choosing (for example Libet et al., 
1983). In this manner, participants can still produce many trials of equivalent 
movements in response to non-signal stimuli and their responses may be recorded.  
However, in some experimental designs it remains preferable to cue an action at a 
precise moment, e.g. when the length of individual trials should be kept consistent. In 
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such cases, participants may be instructed to choose what they do instead of when they 
do it (e.g. Haggard & Eimer, 1999). In this method, actions are cued but preserve a 
critical aspect of volition: the need for the participant to make an action-related decision.  
In some designs, participants may decide to make no action at all. Inhibiting 
movement is a special case of partly-directed action. Inhibition is a particularly difficult 
cognitive phenomenon to study empirically due to the absence of any measurable 
output. Eliciting the absence of voluntary action may be achieved however, by 
instructing the participant to withhold an action that would otherwise normally occur 
as part of a sequence (e.g. Misirlisoy & Haggard, 2014). 
The use of partly directed actions as a means to study volition is a convenient 
compromise, but not without its limitations. Paradigms in which participants choose 
when to act are typically bound by a maximum time period. This time period is typically 
very long and not usually exceeded in practice. Nevertheless, the limit curtails the 
freedom to act completely at will. Similarly, the very existence of instructions within an 
experiment diminishes volition, particularly in repetitive tasks, such as those frequently 
employed in laboratory paradigms. These criticisms must certainly be acknowledged 
and considered in good experimental design. Nevertheless, partly-directed actions 
remains a useful, if imperfect, tool for describing behavioural and neural features that 
accompany simple voluntary movements.  
1.3.4. Simple models of volition 
 
A simple model of volition may be drawn intuitively from everyday experience. In this 
model, there is an intention that temporally precedes an action (figure 1-1).  
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This simple model does not account for any function of the brain, much as dedicated 
models of musculoskeletal movement typically do not consider intentions. Evidence-
based models of volition that included both intention and brain activity were not 
considered for many years. This was partly due to the inability to precisely record brain 
activity at the very precise time scales required.   
The pervasive feeling from everyday experience is that the intention (whatever its 
antecedents) is the first event to occur, so brain activity should likely arise after, 
possibly even as a result of, intention (figure 1-2). This is the naïve dualism of everyday 
life as a conscious agent, and is deeply embedded in our culture. 
 
 
 
 
1.3.5. The Libet experiment  
 
In 1983, Benjamin Libet and colleagues reported the results of an experiment that 
provided electrophysiological evidence against the naïve dualist model. In their 
experiment, participants made a simple action (upwards flexion of the wrist) while 
INTENTION ACTION 
Figure 1-1: A simple model of volition 
INTENTION 
BRAIN 
ACTIVITY 
ACTION 
Figure 1-2: An intuitive model of volition in which brain 
activity is assumed to occur between intention and action 
Figure 1-1: A simple model of volition 
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watching a purpose-designed clock with a single rotating indicator. This method of 
using a chronometric device to report punctate events dates back to the experimental 
designs of Wundt (1907). Participants were instructed to flex their wrist at a time of 
their choosing and, depending on condition, to note the position of the clock when: 
 They first felt the urge to move (referred to as a ‘W’ judgement) 
 They actually flexed their wrist (‘M’ judgement) 
In a separate condition, participants did not perform an action but receive a sensory 
stimulus (tactile contact to the hand) and reported the time they perceived this to occur 
(‘S’ judgement).  
At the same time that this simple behavioural task was being performed, the authors 
recorded EEG measurements to determine the onset and nature of the so-called 
‘readiness potential’ (RP). Also known as the ‘Bereitschaftspotential’ (Kornhuber & 
Deeke, 1965) the RP is a reliable, consistently negative-going component that precedes 
actions. The naïve dualist model predicts that the RP will not begin until after the 
participant-reported W judgement, i.e. first the intention is formed and then the brain 
begins to prepare at an appropriate interval before movement. Libet and colleagues 
found evidence contrary to this prediction.  
The results obtained by Libet et al. (1983) showed that the onset of the RP measured at 
the vertex, where it was maximal, occurred significantly in advance of the intention to 
act as reported by the participant (W judgement). RP onset was typically observed more 
than 1 s before the actual movement.  By contrast, participants’ W judgements were on 
average only about 200ms before the action occurred (see figure 1-3 below). This was 
taken as clear evidence that brain activity preceded intentions and not vice versa.  
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Figure 1-3: The Libet paradigm. A: an example of a clock stimulus used by participant to note the time of 
intention and action events. B: a schematic RP trace showing typical scalp voltage readings over time, with 
critical experimental events (W and M judgements) marked. 
 
The method described by Libet is not without its shortcomings (see Banks & Pockett, 
2007 for a review). It is unclear how participants deploy and divide their attention 
between the clock face, the moving indicator, and other elements such as the button 
press. Furthermore, participants’ reports may also be unreliable due to retrospective 
reconstruction and individual strategies for judgement.  While these criticisms are valid, 
the paradigm has enjoyed more than three decades of replication, with results that are 
seemingly robust to a variety of contexts, materials and populations (Eimer & Hagard, 
1999; Moretto et al., 2011; Ganos et al., 2014). Results from experiments that employ 
this method must therefore be interpreted with caution, but represent an important 
means of insight into the underlying mechanisms of voluntary action. Results in Libet-
type experiments suggest that participants can report a subjective experience related to 
a voluntary action, but do not in themselves show what processes give rise to this 
experience. 
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1.3.6. Pre-movement cortical activity – the Readiness Potential 
 
The precise definition and nomenclature of pre-movement cortical potentials has 
historically varied considerably by author and by research question (Kornhuber & 
Deecke, 1965; Shibasaki et al., 1980; Tarkka & Hallett, 1991; Cui & Deecke, 1999). 
Relevant to the aims and focus of this thesis, investigations on self-initiated actions 
generally refer to a readiness potential (RP) or bereitschaftspotential. The two main 
features of the RP are generally considered to be: an early, negative-going segment with 
a shallow slope that begins around 2s prior to movement onset, and a later segment 
with a steeper slope beginning at about 400ms prior to movement onset (Shibasaki & 
Hallett, 2006).  
The neuroanatomy of the RP has been elucidated by various methods including 
principal component analysis (PCA) and EEG dipole source analysis (Toma, 2002), as 
well as recording from electrodes implanted in patients being treated for intractable 
epilepsy (Ikeda & Shibasaki, 2003).  The consensus from such investigations is that the 
RP is first detectable in the anterior part of the supplementary motor area (SMA) known 
as the pre-SMA, then in the SMA proper, followed by the premotor cortex. The late 
segment of the RP is centred on the primary motor area (M1) (Neshige et al., 1988), 
which is unsurprising given its immediate temporal proximity to movement onset.  
Interestingly, the two main components of the RP may each be influenced by different 
factors. Learning, preparation and speed of movement have been shown to influence the 
size (learning) and onset (preparation, speed) of the early segment (Lang, 2003). The 
later component may be influenced by precision (Simonetta et al., 1991) and complexity 
(Kitamura et al., 1993). Both may be affected by pathology (see below section 1.3.9.). 
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A critical consideration when extracting RP traces from EEG data is determining a 
suitable baseline. The baseline should precede both intention and RP onset, but no 
independent evidence is available to determine when an RP begins. A common practice 
is to select a short window from the beginning of recordings and take the average 
amplitude in that window as a baseline. However this makes a strong assumption that 
activity at recording sites is somehow at a consistent default or rest state and that the 
RP has not yet begun. This assumption and a potential correction are addressed in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
1.3.7. Wider neuroanatomy of voluntary actions 
 
The readiness potential does not occur in isolation, nor is it the only important input to 
M1. Research on monkeys shows that the pre-SMA and SMA proper receive inputs from 
both the basal ganglia and, to a much lesser degree, the cerebellum (Akkal, Dum, & 
Strick, 2007). In humans, Loukas and Brown (2004) used recordings from implanted 
electrodes in the subthalamic nucleus (STN) to successfully predict self-paced 
movements. Figure 1-4 below shows putative motor preparation pathways. The 
implications of a subcortical-cortical loop in patients with reduced neural output from 
the basal ganglia (e.g. in Parkinson’s disease) is discussed below in section 1.3.9. 
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Figure 1-4: A pathway of cortical activity preceding onset of a voluntary action, showing projection from the 
basal ganglia and prefrontal cortex to the SMA (initially the pre-SMA) and then to the primary motor area 
(M1). Adapted from Haggard (2008). 
 
1.3.8. From brain activity to a subjective experience of volition 
 
In an attempt to more clearly describe how brain activity may give rise to a subjective 
feeling of volition, an influential model was proposed by Hallett (2007). Hallett’s model 
is largely informed by primate experiments in which movements are triggered when the 
activity of relevant cell networks reaches a specific threshold. This has been observed in 
the frontal eye fields for saccadic movement (Schall, 2002) and in the motor cortex for 
limb movements (Lecas, Requin, Anger, & Vitton, 1986). According to Hallett, volition 
arises when motor preparation reaches a specific initial threshold and the action itself 
arises when motor preparation reaches a later threshold. The later action threshold 
represents a ‘point of no return’, after which the movement necessarily occurs.  
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Figure 1-5: Modelling awareness of intentions and actions as signal detection. Y-axes represent accumulation 
of neural activity in premotor areas (motor preparation) preceding a specific action. X-axes represent time in 
the moments before the action takes place. Where initial motor preparation is noisy (lower two frames) 
raised threshold may provide a less ambiguous signal. Here W represents awareness of intention and M 
represents awareness of the movement ‘trigger’ or point-of-no-return. 
Importantly, the accumulation of motor preparation is thought to occur in frontal motor 
networks (Hallett, 2007; Fried et al., 2011), as part of the subcortical-cortical loops 
described earlier. Given that these are the specific areas that precede action initiation 
from M1, the timings of W and M judgements in the Libet paradigm map easily onto 
Hallett’s model. The first threshold, at which one becomes aware of the intention to 
move, is the moment reported as the W judgement. The second threshold, at which one 
becomes aware of movement onset, is reported as the M judgement. 
Results in a Libet experiment may therefore provide insight into the underlying features 
of motor preparation preceding a voluntary action. W and M judgements that are 
temporally close might indicate rapidly accumulating motor preparation, which would 
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appear as a steep curve when plotted as in figure 1-5. Similarly, W and M judgements 
that are temporally distant may indicate a shallow curve, representing a slow 
accumulation of motor preparation. However, changes in the perception of W and M 
events may be due to other factors affecting motor preparation, such as neural noise. 
In this model, W and M are assumed to represent different thresholds on the same 
underlying signal, thus affected by the same neural noise. The presence of noise in the 
motor system results in periods of both increasing and decreasing motor preparation. 
Neural activity may therefore cross the threshold for volition (W) several times and by 
several networks (see figure 1-5, middle plot) before reaching the action threshold (M). 
It therefore follows that the W judgement arises in a more ambiguous neural context 
than the M judgement and is thus more variable. This is indeed typically observed in 
Libet-type experiments, including those conducted within the present work (see 
chapters 2 & 3). One may also consider that thresholds are not fixed and may be raised 
or lowered contingent on the neural context. Critically, this model predicts altered 
thresholds in patient groups where motor-related neural noise is pathologically 
disturbed. 
1.3.9. Disordered volition 
 
The subjective nature of volition and the absence of any clear criteria to define precisely 
when it occurs make speaking about ‘disordered’ volition difficult. However, certain 
neurological pathologies are characterised by disorders of voluntary movement. The 
neural abnormalities that accompany such pathologies are by now well known. One 
might reasonably suppose that divergences in these underlying mechanisms should 
manifest as altered experiences of volition. Patients who show abnormal patterns of 
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action initiation, maintenance and termination are therefore a useful population in 
which to study the phenomena associated with volition.  
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is characterised by reduced and slower voluntary 
movements compared to healthy populations (Goetz et al., 2008). Cognitive 
impairments in PD include an increase in impulse control disorders (Weintraub, David, 
Evans, Grant, & Stacy, 2015), apathy (Starkstein et al., 1992) and depression (Cummings, 
1992).  
The primary site of pathology is the substantia nigra, where PD patients show severe 
loss of dopaminergic projection neurons relative to healthy individuals (Braak & Braak, 
2000). However, even from the earliest stages of the disease, this loss is associated with 
impaired function beyond the substantia nigra. The systems affected are varied. 
Research has largely focussed on disorders in dopaminergic pathways in the limbic 
system, however other cell types including cholinergic, GABAergic and glutaminergic 
neurons are also typically implicated (Jellinger, 1991). 
Lesions in the limbic system, particularly the transentorhinal region, have wide-
reaching consequences in PD (Braak et al., 1994). Damage in entorhinal and 
hippocampal areas, as well as the amygdala, interrupts normal communication from 
these sites to cortical and subcortical regions. Learning, memory, emotion regulation 
and motor function are all typically affected (Braak et al., 1996). 
Relevant to the experience of voluntary actions, diminished dopaminergic projection to 
the SMA have been shown to reduce both the occurrence and speed of self-generated 
movements (Jahanshahi et el., 1995). Given the involvement of the SMA and pre-SMA, it 
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seems reasonable to assume that neural markers associated with the motor symptoms 
of PD may be detectable in changes to the readiness potential (RP). 
RP studies of PD have typically measured the amplitude or latency of the negative going 
pre-motor potential. Results have differed considerably between studies (Barrett, 
Shibasaki, & Neshige, 1986; Dick et al., 1987; Jahanshashi et al., 1995; Shibasaki et al., 
1980), however this may reflect methodological differences, particularly in the 
administration of dopaminergic medication. A recent review (Georgiev, Lange, Seer, 
Kopp, & Jahanshahi, 2016) suggests that the most consistent finding from among 14 
relevant studies was a reduction in the amplitude of the early stage RP. The authors 
further noted that the diminished amplitude could be increased by the administration of 
dopaminergic medication (Feve, Bathien, & Rondot, 1992; Dick et al., 1987).  
A recent study (Tabu et al., 2015) examined the awareness of action intentions in PD 
using a Libet task. Participants were elderly (mean age of 67 for males, 70 for females), 
mildly impaired according to established criteria (Goetz et al., 2008) and completed the 
task having not taken dopaminergic medication for at least 12 hours. Patients showed a 
much later W judgement (awareness of intention to act) relative to healthy controls, 
while M judgements (awareness of acting) and S judgements (awareness of a sensory 
event) were unaffected. The authors concluded that due to the relatively mild 
impairment of the cohort, these results were unlikely to be the sole product of cognitive 
deficits.  
It is tempting to conclude that reduced levels of dopamine (DA) may have driven 
delayed intention awareness alongside diminished movement control. Tabu and 
colleagues did not test patients while on dopaminergic intervention, so results from 
their study cannot be used to defend this viewpoint. Furthermore, this hypothesis is not 
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supported by results from patients with Tourette’s syndrome (Moretto et al., 2011), 
described below.  
Tourette’s syndrome is characterised by involuntary movements and vocalisations 
called tics that typically appear in late childhood and often continue into adulthood. The 
ability to control tics varies both between individuals and within individuals over the 
lifespan (Robertson et al., 2009). Tics are a particularly unique case of ‘unwanted’ 
movement in that they are not described as fully automatic (like reflex movements). 
Patients often report ‘urges’ prior to a tic, and many patients learn to control tics as they 
move from adolescence into adulthood (Jackson et al., 2011).  Tics are therefore 
experienced as involuntary, but are mediated by the voluntary motor system. It is 
particularly interesting to note that RPs may be observed prior to tic movements, 
however this is rare and the RPs are shorter in duration compared those of fully 
intended movements in healthy controls (van der Salm et al., 2012).  
Ganos and colleagues (2015) predicted that increased neural noise preceding 
movements in Tourette’s syndrome would result in a later subjective experience of 
action initiation. They reasoned that a less reliable signal around the usual time of RP 
onset would require a more conservative threshold for the detection of volition.  Indeed, 
Moretto and colleagues (2011) previously observed significantly later action awareness 
in Tourette’s syndrome compared to healthy controls. Ganos et al., using the Libet 
method in a study on 27 adolescents, failed to replicate Moretto et al., but found that 
patient reports of volition were indeed influenced by features of the pathology. 
Specifically, although age and severity of tics was not systematically related to a delayed 
awareness of intention, patients who experience strong pre-tic urges also reported a 
later intention to act. Similarly, patients who had good control of their tics, showed a 
36 
 
much earlier awareness of intention. The authors concluded that volition arises as the 
brain learns to discriminate neural noise related to pre-motor preparation.  
Importantly, Tourette’s syndrome is a hyper-dopaminergic condition; so reduced DA 
levels cannot explain delayed awareness of intentions. 
It therefore remains to be determined whether disorders implicating dopamine, such as 
Tourette’s syndrome and PD, are associated with delayed intention awareness due to 
one common or several distinct neural processes. One of the objectives of this thesis is 
to investigate this question by comparing the action awareness of PD patients with 
healthy controls. Critically, the presence of DA-related symptoms in patients will also be 
manipulated in three separate experiments using medication and deep brain 
stimulation (DBS). These interventions will be more fully introduced in the relevant 
sections of chapters 2 & 3. 
1.3.10. Volition – conclusions 
 
Before introducing the Sense of Agency, a related but distinct aspect of voluntary 
movements, it is useful to consider volition in light of the work reviewed thus far. 
 Volition is a key subjective experience in ‘making things happen’ and separates 
considered, planned actions from reflexes and other automatic movements. The brain 
areas associated with volition, and the patterns of activation preceding a voluntary 
movement are by now quite well described. However, it remains to be seen how the 
neural processes that accompany volition are involved in abnormal expressions of 
action awareness in certain pathologies, including Parkinson’s disease. It is hoped that a 
better understanding of disordered volition will lead to a greater understanding of 
volition generally.  
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Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis will describe experimental work investigating volition. 
Brief descriptions of the research aims of these chapters can be found in section 1.5. of 
this introduction.  
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1.4. Introducing the Sense of Agency 
 
1.4.1. Definitions 
 
Volition describes an intention to act, prior to physical movement. Yet the subjective 
experience of ‘doing something’ extends beyond the moment of action onset. The 
everyday feeling of controlling one’s actions is not just about willing them to occur. 
When our actions produce effects in the environment, we feel that we cause those too. 
This cluster of feelings is often referred to as the Sense of Agency (SoA hereafter) 
(Gallagher, 2000; Haggard & Chambon, 2012). SoA is the interplay of volition, action and 
outcome, and a ubiquitous attribute of everyday life. Linking one’s actions to their 
effects informs learning and adaptation, and has been critical in the development of 
man-made civilization. Long-term planning and organisation does not seem possible 
without the ability to appreciate the temporally distal consequences of one’s actions. 
Agriculture, settlement, exploration and exchange have all relied on a developed SoA.  
Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen (2008) describe two main aspects of agency: the feeling 
of agency and the judgement of agency.  The latter refers to an explicit declaration 
that an effect was or was not caused by one’s actions. The feeling of agency, on the other 
hand, is described as a basic, pre-reflective sensorimotor experience, which exists 
independent of explicit judgement. These two phenomena cannot be measured in the 
same way, and each presents distinct challenges in experimental design. 
1.4.2. Measuring agency 
 
Pre- and post-reflexive measures of agency may not be measuring precisely the same 
thing. Dewey & Knoblich (2014) recorded both implicit and explicit measures in a 
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simple agency task. They found that explicit and implicit measures did not significantly 
correlate. Therefore caution is required when interpreting and comparing results both 
within and across experiments. 
Explicit judgements of agency may be measured experimentally by asking 
participants to judge whether or not they caused an effect (e.g. Spengler, Von Cramon, & 
Brass, 2009; Maeda et al., 2012). Alternatively, participants may indicate the degree to 
which they feel they caused the effect (e.g. Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010; Sidarus, 
Chambon, & Haggard, 2013). A critical consideration in experiments such as these is the 
presentation of an alternative ‘cause’ that may realistically be considered by 
participants. Depending on research questions and practical considerations, this may be 
presented as a fellow participant, a confederate or an automated entity such as a 
computer programme or computer-controlled avatar. However, explicit judgements of 
control or agency are influenced both by performance bias (Metcalfe & Greene, 2007), 
and by a general self-serving bias (Bandura, 1989). A confounding effect of errors on 
explicit agency judgements therefore seems inevitable.  
To avoid these potential confounds, and for clarity of interpretation, the experimental 
work in this thesis will be restricted in focus to the pre-reflexive feeling of agency.  
The feeling of agency is not directly measurable. Quantifying a subjective feeling of 
control normally requires finding a robust, replicable proxy measure.  Furthermore, the 
chosen measure should be generalizable. That is, SoA should be reasonably independent 
of the effector used for control (e.g. hand, eye movement, speech), and reasonably 
independent of the modality of the outcome (sound, light, emotion).  
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Chronometric approaches are frequently employed. Participants use an external 
timekeeping device (typically a purpose-designed clock) as an objective reference point 
for stating when they made an action. This method is based on the studies of volition 
described above (specifically the ‘Libet method’, see section 1.3.5.). Critically however, 
agency research also makes use of ‘outcome events’ that follow predictably and reliably 
from the action. These are typically simple auditory or visual stimuli. The perceived 
time of a sensory outcome is often measured alongside the perceived time of the action.  
The use of chronometry is a convenient method of obtaining implicit measures of 
agency. However, alongside independence of effector and modality, SoA is also not 
exclusive to a specific timescale. For example, deciding to press either the left or right 
key in an experimental task takes less than a second, whereas the decision to buy a 
house takes place over a much longer period. Ideally, the method used to measure 
agency should apply across several timescales. At present, the methods used in agency 
research may not adequately fulfil this criterion as they typically work in sub-second 
timescales. Notable exceptions have been provided by Engbert, Wohlschläger, Thomas, 
& Haggard (2007) and by Humphreys and Buehner (2009), who employed time interval 
estimation in place of clock-based judgements. Their results indicated that reliable 
binding effects could be observed at super-second intervals (up to 4 s).  
Restricted generalisability of timescale is accepted as a limitation of the experimental 
work in this thesis, which makes extensive use of a chronometric method known as 
Intentional Binding. 
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1.4.3. The Intentional Binding paradigm 
 
As described, earlier, paradigms that make use of the Libet method may suffer from 
suboptimal reliability of participant responses (Banks and Pockett, 2007; and see 
section 1.3.5.). Contemporary experiments investigating SoA are typically designed to 
safeguard against such criticisms. This is usually achieved by measuring the shift in 
judgements from one condition or group to another. In this case, inaccurate judgements 
are not problematic provided they are consistently inaccurate.  
The “Intentional Binding” paradigm (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002; Walsh & 
Haggard, 2013; for a review, see Moore & Obhi, 2012) has been proposed as a robust 
proxy measure for sense of agency. Participants report the time of an action (e.g. a key 
press) or of an outcome (e.g. an auditory tone). Taken in isolation, these judgements 
serve as a baseline. In operant conditions, the outcome follows the action rapidly and 
reliably. In these conditions, the perceived time of the action tends to shift towards the 
outcome. Similarly, the perceived time of the outcome tends to shift towards the action 
(figure 1-6.). Critically, this effect is not observed for involuntary movements (Haggard, 
Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). Intentional binding is a convenient, implicit, proxy measure 
of agency.  It also may be related to perception of causation more generally, though this 
remains controversial (Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Buehner, 2012; but see Cravo, 
Craessens, & Baldo, 2009; Cravo, Craessens, & Baldo, 2011). There may be many 
possible causes of temporal attraction, however experimental designs that compare 
results between critical conditions can isolate the influence of intention. 
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Figure 1-6: The intentional binding paradigm. Judgements in baseline conditions for actions occurring alone 
or tones occurring alone may not coincide with the actual time of the corresponding event.  When the action 
causes the tone after a delay, the perceived times of action and tone are shifted towards each other. 
Reproduced from Di Costa, Théro, Chambon, & Haggard (2017).  
 
1.4.4. Interpretation of binding 
 
An important research question, hitherto unresolved in the literature, is precisely what 
drives binding. Research suggests a role for various candidate mechanisms.  
Cue integration models suggest that information from multiple sources is combined in 
a weighted average. Ernst and Banks (2002), for example, asked participants to 
estimate the height of a stimulus given visual and haptic information. Reliability of 
information was manipulated by increasing variance. Results showed that the influence 
of each modality on the final estimate depended on the reliability of that information.  
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Applying this model to Intentional Binding implies that action and outcome serve as 
cues. When one cue is less reliable or salient, it may be ‘captured’ by the other stimulus. 
Capture in this sense would be observable by increased perceptual shift. Wolpe et al. 
(2013) provided partial evidence for this interpretation. The authors manipulated the 
reliability of auditory outcomes by playing sounds at volumes near or far from 
participants’ perceptual thresholds. They found that, as predicted by cue integration, 
action binding was reduced when volume was near the perceptual threshold. In other 
words, the action event was not captured as strongly by the auditory outcome when this 
was weakly perceived. Tone binding appeared unaffected by the manipulation, 
suggesting that the mechanisms driving action and tone binding are at least partially 
distinct. 
Association formation has been proposed as an alternative candidate mechanism 
underlying binding. Evidence for this hypothesis was reported in a binding experiment 
that manipulated action-outcome contingency (Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009). 
Participants chose whether or not to press a key on each trial. For some participants, 
the probability of a tone occurring after a keypress was set at chance (50%). For other 
participants, the probability was set at 75%. Contingency was defined in this 
experiment as the probability of an outcome given an action, minus the probability of 
the same outcome given no action. Therefore, the authors separately manipulated the 
probability that a tone would occur in the absence of a keypress. Participants in each 
condition therefore experienced both contingent and non-contingent blocks of trials.  
Results indicated that binding was indeed subject to contingency. In the low probability 
group, contingency was associated with stronger binding only on trials where the tone 
did in fact occur. Conversely, in the high probability group, contingency was associated 
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with stronger binding in trials where the tone didn’t occur. These results add weight to 
the theory that association formation is implicated in binding, but also suggest that 
binding may involve both prospective and retrospective components.  
1.4.5. Interpretation of binding - prospective and retrospective mechanisms 
 
Research suggests that the mechanisms underpinning intentional binding may have 
distinct directions of effect. Wegner and Wheatley (1999) discuss how participants can, 
in certain circumstances, assume responsibility for outcomes they did not actually cause. 
This suggests that agency has a retrospective component, independent of any a priori 
intention.  
A prospective component of agency has also been identified. Moore and Haggard (2008) 
varied the predictability of outcomes in learned action-outcome sequences. They found 
that when auditory outcomes followed actions infrequently, binding was detected only 
on trials where the tone occurred. When tones followed actions frequently, binding was 
also observed when tones were absent. The formation of reliable associations therefore 
appears to be a critical component in binding.  
A similar study investigated this effect in both schizophrenic and healthy subjects (Voss 
et al., 2010). In a high probability condition, tones followed key presses 75% of the time. 
In a low probability condition, tones followed key presses only 50% of the time. The 
prospective aspect of binding was replicated in the control group, where stronger 
binding was observed in the high probability trials, even when the tone was absent. The 
patient group did not show this effect. Interestingly, a strong retrospective influence 
was detected in patients, who showed stronger binding on trials where the tone 
occurred in the low probability condition. This effect was not observed in the control 
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group. This pattern of effects suggests that when a reliable predictive mechanism is 
lacking, retrospection may make take on greater importance. 
It seems clear that both predictive and retrospective mechanisms can influence the 
occurrence and strength of intentional binding. It is unclear whether these mechanisms 
interact or remain exclusive from each other. More research is also required to 
adequately determine the factors that contribute to prospective and retrospective 
influences on implicit measures of the sense of agency.  
1.4.6. Desired and undesired outcomes 
 
Our actions do not always produce the effects we would like. In an ideal world, we 
would only cause positive, desired changes in our environment. Occasionally however, 
negative, undesirable effects occur. Only a few studies have attempted to link the sense 
of agency with outcome valence. Takahata et al. (2012) associated auditory tones with 
monetary rewards or penalties. Their results showed reduced binding for trials that 
resulted in a penalty compared to neutral or rewarded trials. Yoshie and Haggard 
(2013) used valenced human voices as outcomes and found that binding was 
significantly reduced when actions produced negative outcomes. Interestingly, in both 
cases only negative outcomes produced an effect. Positive and neutral outcomes were 
not differentiated in binding measures. Furthermore, only composite binding measures 
(in which action and tone binding are added) were reported in both cases.  
It therefore remains to be determined how valenced outcomes may affect action or tone 
binding separately. Manipulation of desired and undesired outcomes is a hallmark of 
decision-making research. This thesis will therefore make use of established decision-
making paradigms, introduced below, to investigate the sense of agency.  
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1.4.7. Reward-based decision-making 
 
Studies investigating reward-based choice behaviour typically involve explicit goals. 
Goals may include accumulating points, earning money, or simply causing a pre-defined 
stimulus to manifest. Importantly, these studies are not usually concerned with any 
specific motor movement. Rather, the focus is on the explicit choice being made. A 
critical question is why one alternative would ever be chosen over another.  
1.4.8. Reinforcement learning 
 
Reinforcement learning offers a parsimonious explanation for choice behaviour. The 
basis of reinforcement learning is operant conditioning. An action that precedes a 
favourable outcome is likely to be repeated (Skinner, 1938). A critical component of this 
mechanism appears to be temporal proximity. Different kinds of rewards have 
successfully induced reinforcement learning in humans. Examples that have withstood 
decades of replication include monetary and food rewards (see Sescousse, Caldú, Segura, 
& Dreher, 2013 for a review).  
The neural basis for reward processing is well-established. Old and Milner (1954) 
directly stimulated the brains of rats whenever they pressed a lever. Stimulation in the 
septal area was enough to drive perseverative pressing of the lever. These results were 
striking because the rodents did not experience the reward stimulus with their senses, 
only as neural stimulation. In humans, Knowlton, Mangels and Squire (1996) found that 
PD patients with neostriatal damage were unable to learn reward contingencies. This 
occurred despite patients reporting accurate memory for the training events. These 
results were compared with amnesiac patients who retained no memory of training, yet 
learned the reward contingencies. 
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Dopaminergic midbrain neurons appear to play a key role in the so-called ‘reward 
circuit’ (Haber & Knutson, 2010). Drevets et al. (2001) used Positron Emission 
Tomography (PET) to measure drug-induced DA release in humans. DA increase in the 
ventral striatum positively correlated with subjects’ reported ‘euphoria’. These results 
were compatible with previous animal research. 
Sometimes it is not a reward itself but the expectation of reward that matters. 
Reinforcement learning relies on the fact that subjects associate sensory events with 
outcomes. When the predicted consequence of an event fails to arise, a negative 
prediction error occurs. Conversely, a positive prediction error accompanies the 
delivery of an unexpected reward. 
Prediction errors are often studied using probabilistic reward schedules. McClure, 
Berns, & Montague (2003) trained human subjects to expect a juice reward following 
presentation of a light. On some trials, juice was withheld following the light. On other 
trials, juice was delivered without the light. Blood-oxygen level dependent (BOLD) 
changes were measured with fMRI in the period before subjects would normally expect 
delivery of a reward. Negative prediction errors (expected juice, no juice delivered) 
were accompanied by reduced activity in the putamen. Positive prediction errors (no 
expectation of juice, juice delivered) were accompanied by increased activity in the 
putamen. Both contrasts were made to ‘normal’ events (juice expected and delivered, or 
no expectation of juice and no juice delivered). Single unit recordings of dopamine 
neurons in the macaque have shown a similar pattern of results (Hollerman & Schultz, 
1998; Bayer & Glimcher, 2005). 
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Prediction errors are clearly important for learning in dynamic environments. Inducing 
prediction errors in decision-making experiments is often achieved using reversal 
learning tasks. 
1.4.9. Reversal learning  
 
Reversal learning paradigms have been used extensively in psychological research. The 
paradigms typically require the participant to track occasional changes in action-
outcome mappings, and adjust action selection accordingly (Rolls, 2000; Cools, Clark, 
Owen, & Robbins, 2002). The critical feature of such tasks is a transition, either gradual 
or abrupt, in the value of choices. Participants must therefore constantly monitor 
outcomes to ensure optimal decision-making.  
Reversal learning is normally distinguished from tasks where probability schedules 
shift constantly and independently. The two-stage Markov task is one such example 
(Daw, Gershman, Seymour, Dayan, & Dolan, 2011; Wunderlich, Smittenaar, & Dolan, 
2012; Smittenaar, Prichard, FitzGerald, Diedrichsen, & Dolan, 2014). In these tasks, the 
chance of reward shifts by a small amount on each trial, but an increase in probability is 
as likely as a decrease. In other words, probabilities are shifting, but not necessarily 
reversing. 
A study by Cools et al. (2002) offers an illustrative example of the reversal-learning 
paradigm. In this task, participants were presented with two abstract patterns on a 
computer screen. In the acquisition phase, choosing one of the patterns usually led to a 
positive outcome (green smiley face). Choosing the other usually led to a negative 
outcome (red sad face). During the reversal phase, the probability schedules reversed 
after between 10-15 ‘optimal’ choices. The authors identified two kinds of error in this 
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task: reversal errors were sup-optimal choices made immediately following a reversal, 
i.e. continued reliance on the previously rewarded choice. Probability errors were 
optimal choices that were followed by negative feedback. Critically, the subject cannot 
distinguish whether any individual error trial is a reversal or probability error. 
Research shows that patients with deficits in planning behaviours are typically 
impaired in performance on reversal-learning tasks. Ersche et al. (2008) found that 
stimulant-dependent individuals (cocaine or amphetamines) took significantly longer to 
reach a reversal criterion than healthy controls. Patzelt, Kurth-Nelson, Lim & 
MacDonald (2014) showed that this is likely to be due to excessive switching, at least in 
cocaine users. 
Reversal-learning paradigms are ideally suited to examine goal-directed decision-
making for two reasons: firstly, the ability to separate action-outcome associations from 
outcome valence, and secondly, the sensitivity of the task to planning and strategizing 
deficits and the ability to categorize changes in learning rate.  
It remains to be determined how performance on such tasks interacts with measures of 
SoA. Indeed, the fields of motor control and goal-based decision-making have evolved 
separately in the literature. Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this thesis will describe work that 
represents a first attempt to combine these distinct research traditions.  
1.4.8. Neural correlates of the Sense of Agency 
 
Depending on individual definitions and methods, SoA may implicate a number of 
cognitive processes including volition, action monitoring and time perception generally. 
Delineating specific neural substrates related to agency is therefore not trivial. 
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Sperduti and colleagues (2011) conducted a meta-analysis including more than 200 
subjects from 15 neuroimaging (PET and fMRI) studies of agency. In these studies, 
participants provided judgements or implicit attributions of agency to the self or to an 
external source (computer programme, avatar etc). Comparing across these two 
conditions, the authors found a dissociable pattern of neural behaviour. Non-agency 
was associated with activity in the inferior parietal lobe and superior temporal gyrus, as 
well as the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Self-agency was most strongly associated 
with activity in the insula. These results are perhaps unsurprising, as connectivity in 
related areas has also been described in neuroimaging studies of volition (see section 
1.3.6.). ‘Intention information’ would be a necessary component of models of agency 
based on the comparison of desired and actual outcomes, such as the comparator model 
(Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002).  
Evidence from non-invasive brain stimulation experiments has also shed light on 
agency in the brain. Khalighinejad, Di Costa and Haggard (2016) conducted a meta-
analysis of seven experiments investigating the effect of anodal transcranial direct 
current stimulation (tDCS) of the prefrontal cortex on intentional binding. Results 
suggested that stimulation increased the temporal binding of actions to their outcomes. 
Critically, this effect was restricted to conditions in which participants were free to 
choose which of two keys to press (compared to conditions with explicit action 
instructions). It has also been shown that intentional binding can be disrupted by theta-
burst transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the pre-SMA (Moore, Ruge, Wenke, 
Rothwell, & Haggard, 2010). Curiously, this effect manifested differently between 
individuals. For some participants, binding of actions to subsequent outcomes was 
stronger, while for others, binding of outcomes back to actions was stronger.  
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While the picture that emerges from these collective studies is far from clear, it seems 
likely that premotor mechanisms underlying volition also contribute to the SoA. This 
may occur when efference copies of voluntary actions from frontal areas are compared 
to experienced sensory events, most likely in the parietal cortex.  
Further clues to the mechanisms underlying agency may be found in populations with 
disordered SoA. 
1.4.9. Disordered Sense of Agency 
 
In healthy populations, SoA is not always an accurate perception of reality. There is a 
tendency to attribute frequent or desired outcomes to the self more than objective 
contingencies dictate. Interestingly, this ‘self-serving’ bias is diminished in cases of 
depression (Bandura, 1989; Alloy & Abramson, 1979). One should therefore be careful 
to distinguish between abnormal and inaccurate SoA when investigating agency in cases 
of pathology. The use of implicit measures of agency avoids this potential confound. 
Delusions of control are a key feature of schizophrenia, in which objectively self-caused 
actions may be attributed to external sources, possibly arising from a breakdown of 
comparator mechanisms (Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000). Interestingly, 
schizophrenic patients, despite being more likely to explicitly attribute actions to 
external sources, show stronger, rather than weaker, intentional binding (Haggard, 
Martin, Taylor-Clarke, Jeannerod, & Franck, 2003). These results are a useful reminder 
that judgements and feelings of agency do not always tell the same story. Interestingly, 
the observed difference in intentional binding occurs on top of a general tendency to 
underestimate time perception intervals in schizophrenia, a tendency also seen in PD 
(Artieda, Pastor, Lacruz, & Obeso, 1992). 
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The implication of dopaminergic pathways in the experience of volition suggests that 
PD patients might also show disordered SoA. Indeed it has been shown that 
manipulation of dopaminergic medication does influence implicit measures of agency 
(Moore et al., 2010). The intentional binding of PD patients OFF medication (i.e. 
hypodopaminergic) was not significantly different to healthy controls. Yet patients ON 
medication (i.e. hyperdopaminergic) showed significantly stronger binding than while 
OFF medication. These results suggest that changes in SoA probably do not change 
linearly with availability of DA, but that DA manipulation does exert an influence on 
detection of action-outcome events, and thus SoA. Despite the known involvement of DA 
in reward processing (Schultz, 2013), there are currently no studies that investigate SoA 
in PD using experimental contexts that also manipulate reward.  
1.4.10. Sense of Agency – conclusions 
 
Most previous laboratory research on SoA has lacked ecological validity.  Human actions 
outside the laboratory are embedded in a rich perceptuomotor, affective and social 
landscape.  Studies of agency have investigated associations between one simple action 
(Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002) or very few actions (Sirigu et al., 1999), and an 
arbitrary effect, such as a tone, or a very direct effect, such as visual feedback of one’s 
own action. These actions are generally instructed by an experimenter.  Outside the 
laboratory, however, people can generally select among several possible actions in a 
given situation, and they select a particular action because of a goal they wish to achieve.  
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this thesis represent a first attempt to use features of reward-
based decision-making to study agency in health and disease.  
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1.5. Overview of experimental work 
 
Chapter 2: Awareness of intentions and actions in Parkinson’s disease 
Experiments 1 and 2 examine the effect of dopamine manipulation on 
awareness of actions and intentions in a Libet task. Experiment 1 compares 
patients with Parkinson’s disease both OFF and ON dopaminergic medication, 
and healthy controls. Experiment 2 compares patients with Parkinson’s disease 
both OFF and ON deep brain stimulation (DBS). 
Chapter 3: Neural correlates of intentions and actions in Parkinson’s disease 
Experiment 3 examines neural activity preceding actions in patients with 
Parkinson’s disease, both off and on DBS, using electroencephalography (EEG). 
Neural activity is compared to awareness of action and intentions in a Libet task. 
Chapter 4: A novel paradigm combining reversal learning and intentional binding 
Experiments 4, 5 and 6 describe a novel experimental paradigm to study the 
Sense of Agency, combining intentional binding with reversal learning. 
Chapter 5: Further investigations of agency in reward-based decision-making 
Experiments 7 and 8 address critical potential confounds in the novel paradigm 
introduced in chapter 4. 
Chapter 6: A meta-analysis of results from studies employing the novel paradigm 
This chapter describes a multi-study statistical analysis to determine the 
reliability and strength of key effects observed in chapters 4 and 5, and from 
work external to this thesis. 
Chapter 7: The Sense of Agency and decision-making in Parkinson’s disease 
Experiment 9 applies the novel paradigm to a Parkinson’s patient group to 
determine if and how neural features of the pathology are associated with key 
effects observed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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Chapter 2:  Awareness of actions and intentions in Parkinson’s 
disease. 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The following two chapters will describe three experiments using the Libet paradigm 
(see section 1.3.5.), comparing data from patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) and 
healthy controls.  
The experiments in this chapter were behavioural studies in which the presence of 
dopamine-related symptoms were manipulated either by medication (experiment 1) or 
Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) (experiment 2).  
Chapter 2 will describe a second study using DBS (experiment 3) in which 
electroencephalography (EEG) was used to further elucidate the underlying brain 
mechanisms of voluntary action in PD. 
2.1.1. Actions and intentions in Parkinson’s disease.  
 
As outlined in the introduction (section 1.3.9.), PD is a neurological disorder affecting 
motor control. Motor deficits are associated with irregular dopaminergic (DA) 
availability from pathways linking the basal ganglia to the Supplementary Motor Area 
(SMA) (Jahanshahi et el., 1995).  
Another feature of PD is irregular time perception. Research seems to indicate that the 
so-called ‘internal clock’ may be disturbed in PD. Patients typically underestimate time 
intervals in verbal estimation and generate overlong intervals in interval reproduction 
(Pastor, Artieda, Jahanshahi, & Obeso, 1992). Diminished performance in interval 
judgement tasks has been linked to reduced DA levels (Meck, 2005). There is much less 
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available data describing timing judgements for punctate events, however there is 
evidence that awareness of action intentions is also delayed in PD compared to healthy 
controls (Tabu et al., 2015).  
The precise role of DA in disordered time perception in PD is unclear. Studies of patient 
groups OFF dopaminergic medication have suggested that reduced DA activity does not 
directly translate into slower movements or delayed awareness of these movements. 
Rather, it has been suggested (Ganos et al., 2015) that detection thresholds of motor 
intentions may be shifted due to suboptimal accumulation of evidence for a specific 
motor action. In PD, evidence accumulation may be disrupted in the presence of motor-
related symptoms and alleviated by various methods, including medication and DBS. 
Experiments in this chapter and following investigated the influence of pathology and 
DA-related interventions on awareness of actions and intentions in PD.  
2.1.2. Aims of this chapter 
 
Experiments 1 and 2 used a Libet task to compare the perceived times of actions and 
intentions in PD patients while OFF and ON intervention (medication or DBS). In 
experiment 1, a healthy control group was also used to test for a general effect of 
pathology.  
There were two critical hypotheses. Firstly, if delayed intention awareness is a feature 
of pathology generally, then patients OFF intervention should show a stronger delay 
than healthy controls (as in Tabu et al., 2015). Secondly, diminished or irregular DA 
projections from the basal ganglia to the cortex may be a critical influence on action and 
intention awareness. If so, patients OFF intervention should show a stronger tendency 
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to give later timing judgements than the same patients ON intervention. The cohorts 
and critical comparisons of experiments 1 and 2 are shown below in figure 2-1. 
 
Figure 2-1: Outline of experiments 1 and 2 showing cohorts and critical comparisons. 
 
Previous research on action and intention awareness in PD suggests a number of 
potential outcomes in experiments 1 and 2. These are represented below in figure 2-2. 
Assuming a normal readiness potential (RP) prior to movement onset in healthy 
subjects (panel A of the figure), one may expect that intention awareness but not action 
awareness will be delayed in patients OFF intervention compared to healthy controls, as 
in panel B (Tabu et al., 2015). Alternatively, the diminished amplitude in the early 
premotor RP could result in an early intention awareness followed by late action 
awareness as in panel C. (Jahanshahi et al., 1995). 
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Figure 2-2: Predictions derived from previous research, assuming a normal pre-motor RP in healthy subjects.  
2.2. Experiment 1: Intervention manipulation: medication 
2.2.1. Introduction 
 
In experiment 1, PD patients and healthy controls completed a simplified version of the 
Libet task. While fixating a rotating clock, participants pressed a key, and then reported 
the position of the clock at the time that they made the movement (M judgement) or 
first felt the urge to move (W judgement). 
PD patients completed the task twice. Once while ON their usual prescribed 
dopaminergic medication and once while OFF medication. Withdrawal of medication as 
a dopaminergic manipulation has been successfully used in previous research 
investigating cognitive functions in PD. However, results from these studies show that 
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patients ON medication may show either benefits or deficits relative to their 
performance OFF medication (Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2001; Frank, 
Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004). More information is therefore required to elucidate the 
effect that dopaminergic medication may have on specific cognitive functions.  
2.2.2. Method 
 
Participants 
All experiments in this thesis conformed to the Declaration of Helsinki. All studies in 
chapters 2 and 3 were approved by the Hamburg Ethics Committee. All participants in 
this experiment agreed to participate in the study and signed a consent form. They all 
reported normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing.  
40 PD patients (27 males, mean age ± SD = 58 ± 8) attending the Department of 
Neurology of the University Medical Centre Hamburg-Eppendorf agreed to participate 
and were included in the study. Inclusion criteria were: a diagnosis of PD according to 
the UK Parkinson’s Disease Society Brain Bank criteria, as well as stable treatment and 
clinical condition for at least 4 weeks prior to the study.  
Exclusion criteria were: any major concurrent neurological or psychiatric disorders (no 
exclusions), a score below 25 on the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA) (no 
exclusions) or a score of 16 or more on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (three 
exclusions). One further participant was excluded due to a self-declared inability to 
understand the task. We therefore analysed data from 36 patients.  
36 healthy, age-matched (11 males, mean age ± SD = 59 ± 10) volunteers in Hamburg 
were also included in the study and served as a control group. Control participants were 
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recruited from spouses and friends who accompanied patients to the clinic. One control 
subject was removed due to a BDI score above 16.  
For all patients the following demographic and clinical data were collected: Hoehn & 
Yahr disease severity score (Hoehn & Yahr, 1967), motor impairment in both OFF and 
ON medication conditions according to the Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale 
Part 3 motor examination (UPDRS-III) and Levodopa (L-dopa) and dopamine-agonist 
(D-Ag) equivalent daily dose (LEDD) (Tomlinson et al., 2010).  
The Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA) was employed to assess overall cognitive 
function including: digit span forward and backward for working memory, phonological 
word fluency and categorical word fluency for executive functions and language, and 
Matrix Cancellation Features Target (MCFT) for selective visual attention.  
All patients underwent a neuropsychological assessment including the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI) and the Questionnaire for Impulsive-compulsive Behaviour Disorders 
in Parkinson's disease (QUIP-RS) (Weintraub et al., 2012).  
English language versions of all clinical instruments are included for reference in 
Appendix I. 
Procedure 
The principle features of the Libet task are described fully in section 1.3.5.  
Participants were seated at a standard computer keyboard and screen. They fixated a 
clock with a single rotating hand. The clock diameter was 20 mm and the hand rotated 
every 2560 ms. After waiting for the clock to complete one full rotation, and at a time of 
their choosing, participants pressed the space bar. The clock continued to rotate for a 
random interval (between 1500 and 2500 ms) and then stopped. According to condition, 
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participants were then prompted to judge the position of the clock hand either at the 
moment they pressed the button (M judgement), or at the moment they first 
experienced the urge to press the button (W judgement). Participants reported their 
judgements verbally and the experimenter entered the number using the keyboard. 
Participants completed 8 counterbalanced blocks of 10 trials. W judgements were 
elicited in half the blocks and M judgements in half the blocks. At the start of the 
experiment, participants completed a short training block of each type of trial. This 
training block was repeated until participants were confident with the task. One 
participant declined to participate further due to lack of understanding during the 
training block. 
Patients completed the experiment twice. They arrived at the experiment having not 
taken their prescribed medication for a period of at least 12 hours. The experiment was 
then run for the first time, after which the patients underwent the clinical assessments 
detailed above. Patients were then administered medication and waited half an hour 
before completing the experiment again and undergoing a second clinical assessment.  
There is therefore an inevitable order confound, as patients always completed the task 
OFF medication before ON medication. This is addressed in the discussion (section 
2.2.4.) 
Control participants completed the experiment and underwent the clinical assessment 
only once. 
All stimuli were presented using LabView 2012 (National Instruments, Austin, TX). 
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Analysis 
The dependent variable was calculated by subtracting the W or M judgement from the 
actual time of the button press, as captured by the programme. A negative score 
therefore indicates how long before the button press the participants perceived the W 
or M event to occur. 
The dependent variable was then analysed in two critical comparisons: 
Firstly, to test for an effect of pathology, the data from healthy participants and patients 
OFF medication was submitted to a 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA with factors task (W 
or M judgement) and group (patient or control). 
Secondly, to test for an effect of dopamine, data from patients was submitted to a 2x2 
repeated-measures ANOVA with factors task (W or M) and state (ON or OFF 
medication). 
2.2.3. Results 
 
Clinical data from patients are displayed below in table 2-1. Clinical data from controls 
are displayed below in table 2-2.  
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ID 
 
Hoehn & 
Yahr 
UPDRS 
OFF 
UPDRS 
ON 
LEDD MOCA BDI QUIP 
1 2.0 27 17 200 26 14 11 
2 2.0 23 9 300 28 8 7 
3 1.0 29 13 150 29 1 0 
4 2.5 48 33 300 29 6 7 
5 2.0 24 17 200 29 5 11 
6 1.0 30 21 100 29 9 19 
7 2.0 43 28 200 28 10 19 
8 2.5 31 21 200 27 7 21 
9 2.0 31 19 200 28 7 12 
10 2.5 28 19 250 28 3 3 
11 3.0 32 24 200 27 3 0 
12 2.0 18 14 100 28 6 3 
13 2.0 32 23 200 26 6 19 
14 2.0 31 20 200 28 4 25 
15 2.0 22 12 200 28 11 18 
16 2.0 15 10 200 30 13 25 
17 2.0 19 13 150 27 5 0 
18 2.0 23 15 200 27 8 3 
19 2.0 35 23 200 26 5 14 
20 2.0 34 23 300 29 3 0 
21 2.0 20 14 200 26 1 0 
22 1.0 18 13 150 29 12 2 
23 2.0 27 20 200 30 4 12 
24 2.0 18 13 200 26 10 2 
25 2.0 19 12 150 29 2 0 
26 2.0 36 22 200 29 3 13 
27 2.0 24 12 200 27 7 5 
28 2.0 38 25 150 27 3 3 
29 3.0 29 20 200 28 8 16 
30 1.0 7 4 200 28 12 21 
31 2.0 21 15 200 30 1 4 
32 1.0 10 4 150 30 6 24 
33 3.0 51 34 300 26 4 7 
34 1.5 22 16 100 29 13 25 
35 2.0 21 15 200 30 6 4 
36 1.0 9 5 150 28 6 22 
MEAN 
(±SD) 
2 (±0,5) 26 (±10) 17 (±7) 200 (±50) 28 (±1) 6 (±4) 10 (±9) 
 
Table 2-1: PD patients’ clinical data from experiment 1.  
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ID 
 
MOCA BDI 
C1 27 2 
C2 29 0 
C3 26 0 
C4 26 1 
C5 29 10 
C6 28 4 
C7 29 1 
C8 26 4 
C9 28 1 
C10 30 8 
C11 30 11 
C12 27 5 
C13 26 3 
C14 30 0 
C15 29 0 
C16 30 1 
C17 28 0 
C18 29 2 
C19 29 5 
C20 28 2 
C21 29 8 
C22 26 1 
C23 29 8 
C24 28 2 
C25 26 3 
C26 30 7 
C27 29 11 
C28 29 1 
C29 27 0 
C30 28 14 
C31 28 2 
C32 29 5 
C33 28 0 
C34 30 1 
C35 30 2 
MEAN 
(±SD) 
28 (±1) 4 (±4) 
 
Table 2-2: Healthy controls’ clinical data from experiment 1. 
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A between-subjects ANOVA to compare healthy controls with patients OFF medication 
yielded a significant main effect of task, with W judgements earlier than M judgements 
(F(1,69) = 54.99, p < .001,  = .44). There was no significant effect of group (F(1,69) < .001, 
p = .996) and no interaction (F(1,69) = .33, p = .57). There was therefore no evidence that 
PD patients performed any differently to healthy controls. 
 
Figure 2-3. W and M judgements of healthy controls and patients OFF medication in experiment 1. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
Using a within-subjects ANOVA to compare patients OFF and ON medication again 
yielded a significant main effect of task, with W judgements earlier than M judgements 
(F(1,35) = 31.2, p < .001,  = .47). There was also a significant effect of medication state 
(F(1,35) = 5.24 , p = .028,  = .13) but no interaction (F(1,35) = .62, p = .44), suggesting that 
patients perceived both W and M events as occurring earlier while on dopaminergic 
medication. 
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Figure 2-4. W and M judgements of patients while OFF and ON medication in experiment 1. Error bars 
represent standard errors. 
 
2.2.4. Discussion 
 
The results obtained in experiment 1 show a consistent and strong effect of the task 
requirement (W or M). Ordinarily, this would only indicate that participants understood 
and carried out the instructions. However, disordered motor control and time 
perception are features of PD. One may therefore expect that even if the patient group 
understood the instructions, their subjective experience of the W and M judgements 
may differ from healthy controls. The main effect of task, without an interaction, 
therefore provides evidence that the patient group were able to complete the task with 
comparable precision to controls. 
Furthermore, and contrary to the results obtained by Tabu and colleagues (2015), there 
was no significant effect of pathology and therefore no evidence that patients OFF 
medication differed from healthy controls in their subjective perception of action and 
intentions. 
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Finally, there was a main effect of dopamine. Patients made significantly earlier W and 
M judgements while ON medication than while OFF medication. There was no 
interaction, so it appears that increased DA levels may boost both action and intention 
awareness. These results therefore do not support the predictions illustrated in panels 
B and C of figure 2-2.  
These results contain a necessary order confound as patients always completed the 
experiment while OFF medication first, and then again while ON medication. 
Dopaminergic medication takes time to achieve full efficacy, so this confound can only 
normally be eliminated by running two separate experimental sessions. This was 
considered inconvenient as participants were selected from a clinical group who mostly 
lived far from the experimental location. Order-related factors, such as fatigue and 
boredom cannot therefore be ruled out as alternative explanations for the effect 
observed.  
These results are further considered in the general discussion of this chapter (section 
2.4.) with the results from experiment 2.  
2.3. Experiment 2: Intervention manipulation: Deep Brain 
Stimulation 
 
2.3.1. Introduction 
 
Experiment 2 was designed to further test the hypothesis that disordered time 
perception in PD is linked to irregularity of dopamine projections from the basal ganglia 
to premotor cortical areas. 
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Experiment 1 established that PD patients performed with comparable precision to 
healthy controls in a Libet task. This experiment therefore continues the use of the Libet 
paradigm without healthy controls. Regularity of the dopaminergic basal-cortical drive 
was manipulated by means of deep brain stimulation (DBS) of the subthalamic nucleus 
(STN).  
DBS is a surgical therapeutic option for PD patients with intractable tremor and severe 
cases of dyskinesia (Volkmann, 2004). Surgically implanted electrodes with multiple 
contacts use high frequency ( > 100 Hz) stimulation to provoke a neural disturbance 
similar to a surgical lesion. Lesions in target areas of the basal ganglia have previously 
been shown to alleviate symptoms of PD (Koller, Pahwa, Lyons, & Albanese, 1999). The 
precise mechanisms that result in therapeutic improvement have not been conclusively 
determined, however it is thought (Santinello et al., 2015) that stimulation leads to a 
general regularization of neuronal firing patterns in the closed-loop incorporating the 
basal ganglia, thalamus and cortical motor areas. The effects of DBS on voluntary motor 
system neurophysiology will be further discussed in chapter 3. 
Similar results to experiment 1 were predicted, i.e. patients would report earlier W and 
M judgements while ON stimulation than while OFF stimulation. 
2.3.2. Methods 
 
Participants 
All participants agreed to participate in the study and signed a consent form. They all 
reported normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing, and were paid for their time.  
20 PD patients (13 males, mean age ± SD = 65 ± 7) attending the Department of 
Neurology of the University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf agreed to participate 
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and were included in the study. Inclusion criteria were: a diagnosis of PD according to 
the UK Parkinson’s Disease Society Brain Bank criteria and a surgically implanted DBS 
device; treatment and clinical condition stable for at least 4 weeks prior to the study. 
Exclusion criteria were: any major concurrent neurological or psychiatric disorders, a 
score < 25 on the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA) (one exclusion) or a score of 
16 or more on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (two exclusions). We therefore 
analysed data from 17 patients. 
Demographic and clinical data were gathered using the same instruments as 
experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The general procedure was the same as experiment 1. 
Participants completed the experiment twice: once with the DBS device active (ON) and 
once with the device inactive (OFF). Experimental sessions were followed by clinical 
assessments as in experiment 1. The required waiting time for the DBS device to change 
state (active/inactive) was set at half an hour. As the device attains efficacy within this 
time period, it was possible to counterbalance the order of conditions thereby 
eliminating the order confound in experiment 1. 
Analysis 
The dependent variable in the Libet task was again calculated as the judged clock 
position minus the clock position at the time of the button press. 
Data were submitted to a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors task (W or M) and 
stimulation state (OFF or ON) 
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2.3.3. Results 
 
Patients’ clinical data are provided below in table 2-3. 
ID 
 
Hoehn & 
Yahr 
UPDRS 
OFF 
UPDRS 
ON 
MOCA BDI QUIP 
D1 3.0 45 30 28 13 18 
D2 2.0 49 24 29 1 20 
D3 2.0 25 18 28 3 20 
D4 2.5 39 24 30 11 6 
D5 2.0 27 20 29 6 7 
D6 3.0 67 44 28 8 2 
D7 2.0 26 16 26 12 10 
D8 3.0 46 40 25 4 5 
D9 2.0 18 13 30 1 0 
D10 2.0 29 14 29 4 19 
D11 3.0 18 13 26 12 2 
D12 2.0 19 3 26 4 0 
D13 2.0 10 1 30 9 4 
D14 3.0 42.5 21 28 4 6 
D15 2.5 18 13 29 2 0 
D16 2.0 38 14 28 2 27 
D17 2.0 45 18 29 13 0 
MEAN 
(±SD) 
2 (0.5) 33 (15) 19 (11) 28(2) 6(4) 9(9) 
 
Table 2-3: PD patients’ clinical data from experiment 2 (DBS) 
 
As in experiment 1, there was a strong effect of task, with W judgements earlier than M 
judgements (F(1,16) = 18.13, p < .001,  = .53). There was no significant effect of state 
(F(1,16) = 1.66, p = .22) and no interaction (F(1,16) = .16, p = .69). There was therefore no 
evidence that PD patients experienced events differently while ON than while OFF DBS. 
Note however that the pattern of results is numerically similar to experiment 1 (see 
figure 2-4 above, and figure 2-5 below). 
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Figure 2-5. W and M judgements of patients OFF and ON DBS in experiment 2. Error bars represent standard 
errors. 
 
2.3.4. Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 did not find an effect of stimulation state, seemingly at odds with the 
results obtained in experiment 1. There was a strong effect of task (W/M judgement), 
indicating that in both states participants were able to complete the experiment with 
comparable precision. 
The lack of an effect of simulation state in experiment 2 may be due to inherent 
differences in the interventions. DBS alleviates symptoms by influencing the neuronal 
activity at specific sites in the basal ganglia, specifically the STN, whereas dopaminergic 
medication has a systemic effect on dopamine receptors. Indeed, it has previously been 
shown that medication and DBS may have differential effects on PD symptoms (Frank, 
Samanta, Moustafa, & Sherman, 2007), although the precise mechanisms underlying 
these differences remain unclear.   
-300 -200 -100 0
  M
  W
time in ms before keypress (at 0) 
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OFF
DBS 
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Comparison across experiments 
Lack of a stimulation effect may also be due to sample size. Experiment 2 comprised 
roughly half as many participants as experiment 1. Numerically, the pattern of results in 
both experiments was similar. A follow-up analysis was therefore performed which 
included results from both experiments. Data were submitted to a 2x2x2 ANOVA with 
factors task (W or M) and state (OFF or ON), as before, as well as an additional factor of 
intervention (MED or DBS). A Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons was 
applied. 
The analysis yielded a significant main effect of task, as expected, with W judgements 
earlier than M judgements across conditions (F(1, 51) = 45.1, p < .001,  = .47) and a 
significant main effect of state, with participants making earlier judgements across 
conditions while in an ON state than while in an OFF state (F(1, 51) = 5.99, p = .02,  
= .11). There was no significant effect of the type of intervention (F(1, 51) = .27, p = .61) 
and no significant interactions (task x intervention: F(1, 51) = .21, p = .65; state x 
intervention: F(1, 51) = .05, p = .82; task x state: F(1, 51) = .64, p = .43; task x state x 
intervention: F(1, 51) = .01, p = .93).  
The results of this analysis suggest that there may indeed be a general effect of 
dopaminergic intervention, independent of delivery method. Experiment 2 might not 
have detected this effect due to a small sample size. More research is therefore required 
to delineate the effects and mechanisms particular to each type of intervention. 
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2.4. General discussion 
 
The results obtained in these experiments suggest that PD patients, despite motor and 
cognitive impairment, are able to adequately complete a Libet task. Furthermore, there 
was no evidence that PD patients performed with any diminished precision relative to 
healthy controls. These results are in contrast to Tabu et al. (2015) who found that 
awareness of intentions was delayed in PD. This discrepancy in replication may be due 
to factors that differed between the two studies. As an example, the age of participants 
may have influenced performance (participants in Tabu et al. were roughly ten years 
older on average). 
It was found that increasing DA availability through medication was associated with 
earlier judgements of both action and intention awareness in PD patients. Alleviation of 
DA-related symptoms by DBS did not appear to have the same effect, suggesting that the 
observed shift in time perception in experiment 1 was due to patients being placed in a 
hyper-dopaminergic state. This may be consistent with the ‘dopamine overdose 
hypothesis’ (Vaillancourt, Scholnfeld, Kwak, Bohnen, & Seidler, 2013), according to 
which administration of levodopa can improve cognitive performance in motor 
sequence and reversal learning tasks, but increased doses may results in diminished 
performance on these same tasks. More research may be required to determine 
whether dopamine overload may affect performance in a Libet task, as suggested by the 
results of experiments 1 and 2. 
Interestingly, a follow-up analysis found a significant effect of being ON intervention, 
which did not interact with the specific type of intervention. While medication and DBS 
implicate different neural mechanisms, they share a common functional impact in 
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alleviation of PD symptoms. This common impact may indeed be driving earlier 
judgements in the Libet task, however this was not detected in experiment 2. 
The Hallett model of action and intention awareness (see section 1.3.8.) suggests that 
altered time perception may be due to changes in the timing and rate of motor-related 
evidence accumulation, or altered thresholds of awareness, or both. The lack of any 
interaction with the task (W/M) suggests that rate changes are not a convincing 
explanation, as this would result in steeper or shallower evidence accumulation curves, 
and therefore manifest as larger or smaller ‘gaps’ between W and M judgements.  
Other possible explanations for the observed effect are illustrated in figure 2-6 (below). 
The effect of medication suggests that while in a hyper-dopaminergic state, RPs may 
commence earlier, or detection thresholds may be lowered. This could be a direct 
consequence of increasing the amount of available DA in the neural pathways 
associated with a voluntary action, resulting in a steeper RP curve (panel B). 
76 
 
 Figure 2-6: Candidate mechanisms for earlier W and M judgements.  
Alternatively, one may consider that thresholds of detection are not fixed. If so, the 
motor-facilitating interventions described here may have lowered the thresholds at 
which W and M judgements occurred (panel C). Threshold malleability has been 
described elsewhere. Ganos et al. (2015), for example, provided evidence that 
thresholds may become more conservative in Tourette’s syndrome. In the experiments 
described here, the alleviation of the motor symptoms of PD may result in a neural 
environment where the voluntary action signal emerges more readily from the general 
motor noise. Lowering thresholds would not be problematic, as they would not be 
prone to inappropriate detection of ‘false-alarms’.  
The effects of DBS on awareness of actions and intentions on neurophysiology will be 
further investigated using EEG in the following chapter. The results of experiments 1 
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and 2 will be considered further in the general discussion of chapter 3, with the results 
of experiment 3. 
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Chapter 3: Neural correlates of intentions and actions in 
Parkinson’s disease 
3.1. Introduction  
 
The previous chapter examined how PD patients performed in a Libet task compared to 
healthy controls. It was observed that patients did not display any deficit in completing 
the task relative to controls. However, patients did perform differently when their 
dopaminergic symptoms were reduced by means of medication. In a hyper-dopaminegic 
(medicated) state, patients appeared to judge that actions and intentions occurred 
earlier in time than when in a hypo-dopaminergic state (unmedicated). Furthermore, 
there was some evidence that patients ON intervention judged these events as 
occurring earlier than when OFF intervention (medication or DBD), regardless of the 
type of intervention employed.  
One theoretical explanation for these changes is that DA availability or the alleviation of 
DA-related symptoms, influences the accumulation of evidence preceding a motor event, 
according to the threshold model proposed by Hallett (see section 1.3.8.).  
Experiment 3 investigated whether the observed effects could be explained by a shifted 
onset of the RP, or by a lowering of detection thresholds. This experiment examined 
neural activity preceding voluntary actions in PD patients, both OFF and ON DBS, using 
electroencephalography (EEG).  
DBS of the sub-thalamic nucleus (STN) in PD patients is associated with faster reaction 
onset and movement duration. In a positron emission tomography (PET) study, it was 
reported that motor improvement was accompanied by increased activation in the SMA 
and premotor cortex (Ceballas-Baumann et al., 1999). Similar results have been 
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reported for cued free-choice movements (Limousin et al., 1997) where STN 
stimulation was associated with increased regional cerebral blood flow in the SMA, 
cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. These results demonstrate that 
regulating communication from the STN to pre-motor areas increases activity in these 
sites prior to cued reactions or partly voluntary movements. It remains to be seen if 
similar effects will be observed for actions that are entirely voluntary, as in the Libet 
task used here. 
3.2. Experiment 3: Neural activity preceding a voluntary action in 
Parkinson’s disease: an EEG study. 
3.2.1. Introduction  
 
In experiment 3, neural activity measured with EEG was compared to explicit 
awareness of actions and intentions using the same version of the Libet task used in 
experiments 1 and 2.  
Having established a clear effect of medication, a DBS cohort was used in this 
experiment to further examine the changes that accompany the alleviation of 
dopamine-related symptoms by regulation of the dopaminergic basal-cortical drive. 
Each patient performed the task once with the device active and again with the device 
inactive. Neural traces were then compared between patients OFF and ON DBS.  
Earlier W and M judgements may be the result of an RP that is shifted or ‘stretched’ 
away from the moment of action (see figure 2-6). In experiment 2, earlier judgements 
were observed when DBS was active. One would therefore predict an earlier negative-
going component to emerge when DBS is active in the present experiment.  
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The perceived moments of intention and action may also be perceived as occurring 
earlier due to a lowering of thresholds of detection. In a less noisy motor environment 
(i.e when DBS in active), thresholds may be lowered without introducing ambiguity. In 
this case, earlier W and M judgements could be observed without an early onset RP.  
The role of noise in the present experiment will be investigated with an analysis of the 
variance in RP amplitude in the moments preceding the motor event. There is evidence 
that prior to a voluntary action, there is a rapid drop off in amplitude variability 
(Khalighinejad, Schurger, Desantis, Zmirgod, & Haggard, 2017, preprint). This 
convergence may occur earlier in a less noisy environment, i.e. when DBS is active, 
thereby reducing ambiguity of motor signals in the late stage of the RP and resulting in 
earlier W and M judgements. An analysis of convergence analysis will therefore be 
included in this experiment. 
It was predicted that when patients were ON stimulation, earlier W and M judgement 
would be accompanied by a stronger preparatory drive to frontal motor areas than 
when patients were OFF stimulation. It was also predicted that increased consistency of 
cortical activity would be observed prior to action onset in the ON condition relative to 
the OFF condition. 
3.2.2. Method  
 
Participants 
All participants agreed to participate to the study and signed a consent form. They all 
reported normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing.  
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15 PD patients (13 males, mean age ± SD = 63 ± 8) attending the Department of 
Neurology of the University Medical Centre Hamburg-Eppendorf agreed to participate 
and were included in the study. Inclusion criteria were: a diagnosis of PD according to 
the UK Parkinson’s Disease Society Brain Bank criteria, a surgically implanted DBS 
device and clinical condition stable for at least 4 weeks prior to the study.  
Exclusion criteria were: any major concurrent neurological or psychiatric disorders, a 
score < 25 on the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA) (no exclusions) or a score of 
16 or more on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (no exclusions). 
For all patients, demographic and clinical data were collected as in experiments 1 and 2. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the task in an electrically shielded chamber. Stimuli were 
presented on a computer monitor with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. The space bar of a 
standard keyboard was used to input the voluntary action in the Libet task. Participants 
were fitted with the EEG cap before the experiment began (cap details below) and it 
was removed at the end of the experiment before debriefing. 
The experimental procedure and analysis was the same as experiment 2 (see section 
2.3.). 
 Participants completed the experiment twice: once with the DBS device active and once 
with the device inactive. The order was counterbalanced across all participants. A 
period of half an hour was required to elapse whenever the active status of the device 
was changed, before continuing with the experiment.  
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EEG activity was recorded referenced to the nose tip from 62 active Ag/AgCl scalp 
electrodes mounted in an elastic cap with equidistant montage (EASYCAP GmbH, 
Herrsching, Germany). The electrodes had integrated impedance converters fitted 
directly into the electrode in order to minimize noise from the surrounding area as well 
as from movement artefacts.  
In order to record EOG activities, two electrodes were placed below the eyes. 
Accelerometer signals were collected simultaneously with the EEG activity. The data 
were bandpass-filtered (0.016–250 Hz) and digitized (sampling rate: 1000 Hz) using 
BrainAmp amplifiers (BrainProducts, Munich, Germany). 
EEG pre-processing 
Data from EEG recordings were processed and analysed in Matlab R2015a (MathWorks, 
MA, USA) using the EEGLab toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). All signals were 
downsampled to 250 Hz and low-pass filtered at 30 Hz. Due to the relatively slow 
fluctuations of the RP, no high pass filter was used. A notch filter at 6 Hz was applied to 
traces recorded when DBS was active, in order to eliminate a systematic electrical 
artefact of the DBS device. This artefact can be seen in sample recordings in Appendix II, 
figure 1.  
Data epochs were defined as the period from 2 s prior, to 1 s after the moment of the 
keypress, as recorded by the programme. Overlap of epochs was impossible, due to the 
timing of the experimental task.  
As mentioned in the introduction (section 1.3.6.), the selection of an appropriate 
baseline is a critical consideration in EEG experiments measuring RPs. Traditionally, the 
period from 2500 to 2000 ms before the action event is used, however this involves the 
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implicit assumption that the RP does not begin until after this time (Shibasaki & Hallett, 
2006). This assumption, although standard, is rarely acknowledged and has been 
questioned by several authors (notably Verbaarschot, Farquhar, & Haselager, 2015; 
Khalighinejad, Schurger, Desantis, Zmigrod, & Haggard, 2017).  
An alternative approach was successfully introduced by Khalighenjad and colleagues 
(2017) on the premise that the only certain element of an action event is the action 
itself. They used a baseline period from -5 to +5 ms around the action. This method was 
validated by running a parallel analysis on demeaned data (using the entire epoch as a 
baseline), which produced consistent results. This choice of baseline is also critical to 
the analysis of variance convergence described below, and was consequently used 
throughout this experiment.  
Ocular movement artefacts and other abnormalities were rejected based on visual 
inspection in an Independent Component Analysis (ICA). Finally, entire data epochs 
were removed if values exceeded ±150 μv. 
Data from 2 participants were excluded following pre-processing due to the limited 
number of usable trials.  
EEG Analysis 
Preliminary inspection of the data showed that a characteristic RP (defined by a slow, 
predominantly negative-going component) was maximal at site FCz. Consequently this 
electrode site was used in the following analyses. Two variables were calculated for 
analysis: mean RP amplitude across trials and variability (SD) of amplitude across trials. 
To compare these variables between OFF and ON states, data from the 2 s preceding the 
action event were divided into four 500-ms windows. The last time bin was shortened 
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by 5 ms to avoid overlap with the baseline period. Taking the action event as time point 
0, the period of these windows was therefore as follows, in ms: [-2000 to -1500], [-1500 
to -1000], [-1000 to -500], and [-500 to -5]. Data were then submitted to four separate 
2x2 ANOVAs, one for each time bin, with factors task (W/M) and DBS state (OFF/ON).  
Alpha values were corrected for the 4 ANOVAs performed, using a partial Bonferroni 
correction. Full Bonferroni corrections have been criticised for being too conservative, 
especially when test outcomes are highly correlated, as here (Perneger, 1998). When 
correlation information is available, the mean correlation between variables may be 
used to adjust the full Bonferroni correction (Sankoh, Huque, & Dubey, 1997). Adjusted 
alpha values were calculated using freely available online interfaces (Uitenbroek, 1997) 
and are reported below in the relevant results sections. 
Across trial variance was further analysed using cluster-based permutation analysis 
(for guidelines see Maris & Oostenveld, 2007). This method involves a user-defined 
selection of electrodes and time-window of interest. Each data point therefore 
represents a channel-time pair. Data points are statistically compared between 
experimental conditions – in this case DBS OFF/ON – using a t-test. Significant channel-
time pairs are then ‘clustered’ according to temporal and spatial adjacency. Note that 
here the t-test is used only to determine candidacy in clusters, not as a final statistical 
value. For each cluster, the t-values of all pairs are summed and compared to a critical 
value obtained using the Monte Carlo method (data are randomly partitioned a user-
defined number of times to create a reference distribution). Importantly, this kind of 
analysis makes no a priori assumptions about electrode sites, time periods or specific 
ERP components.  
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For this experiment, the time-window of interest was -2 to 0 s relative to the action. The 
minimum number of neighbouring electrodes required to form a cluster was 2. The 
number of random partitions required to create the reference distribution was 1000. 
Data from W judgement blocks and M judgement blocks were analysed separately. 
Note that time-pair data cannot be used to localize activity to specific brain areas. 
Rather, the data indicate which electrode sources contributed maximally to an overall 
significant difference in activity across the scalp. 
3.2.3. Results 
 
Patients’ clinical data are provided below in table 3-1. 
ID 
 
Hoehn & 
Yahr 
UPDRS 
OFF 
UPDRS 
ON 
MOCA BDI 
DE1 2.5 45 16 30 11 
DE2 2 35 5 missing 15 
DE3 2 29 16 29 6 
DE4 2 28 10 30 4 
DE5 2.5 55.5 44 27 16 
DE6 2 31 14.5 27 9 
DE7 2 17 6.5 30 5 
DE8 3 42.5 21 30 4 
DE9 2 37 13 missing missing 
DE10 3 18 7 26 12 
DE11 2 missing 18 29 13 
DE12 3 34 26.5 25 21 
DE13 3 36,5 30 28 12 
DE14 2 48 19,5 29 missing 
DE15 2.5 55.5 22 28 13 
MEAN 
(±SD) 
2.32 (.4) 35 (13.1) 17 (10.4) 28 (1.7) 10.8 (5) 
 
Table 3-1: PD patients’ clinical data from experiment 3 
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Behavioural results 
 
As in previous experiments there was a strong effect of task, with W judgements 
perceived as occurring earlier than M judgements (F(1,14) = 10.07, p = .007,  = .42). 
There was no significant effect of state (F(1,14) = .08, p = .78) and no interaction (F(1,14) 
= .11, p = .75). There was therefore no evidence that PD patients experienced the W and 
M events differently when ON DBS than when OFF. 
  
Figure 3-1: W and M judgements in experiment 3. 
 
EEG analysis 
Figure 3-2 (below) shows the mean amplitude at FCz before and after the onset of 
movement separately for W and M judgement data. The use of a baseline from around 
the time of the action results in a non-traditional view of the RP. Values remain 
predominantly positive throughout the pre-motor period and are necessarily zero at 
movement onset. Nevertheless, the data obtained show the characteristic shape of a 
consistently negative-going shift that defines the RP. 
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Amplitude was compared across task and state conditions in four time bins within the 
2s period immediately prior to the action onset. Full results are displayed below in table 
3-2 and figure 3-2. A partial Bonferroni correction for 4 comparisons using correlation 
adjustment yielded an alpha value of .042. This correction is mild compared to a full 
Bonferroni correction, reflecting the strong time-dependence of the data. There was no 
significant main effect of task and no significant interaction in any time bin. This was 
unsurprising as the motor aspects of the Libet task were identical in both W and M 
judgement conditions. There was a significant main effect of DBS state in the first time 
bin (F(1,12) = 6.52, p = .03,  = .35) showing that recordings during this time period 
were significantly stronger when DBS was active than when DBS was inactive.  
 
BIN 1 BIN 2 BIN 3 BIN 4 
 
F(1,12) p F(1,12) p F(1,12) p F(1,12) p 
TASK (W/M) < .01 0.98 0.29 0.6 0.27 0.61 0.1 0.75 
STATE (OFF/ON) 6.52 0.03* 3.09 0.1 0.17 0.69 0.8 0.39 
INTERACTION 0.09 0.77 0.02 0.89 0.74 0.41 2.08 0.18 
         
Table 3-2: Results of analysis of mean amplitude across trials at site FCz in experiment 3, across four time 
bins prior to action onset. Each bin represents a period of 500 ms. Alpha value for each comparison was .042 
because of adjustment for four correlated comparisons. 
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Figure 3-2: Mean amplitude at FCz before and after action (at 0) for W (top panel) and M (lower panel) 
judgements. Shaded areas represent standard errors. 
 
Across trial SD was similarly compared across task and state conditions in four time 
bins within the 2s period immediately prior to the action onset. Full results are 
displayed below in table 3-3 and figure 3-3. A Bonferroni correction for four 
comparisons using correlation adjustment yielded an alpha value of .02. Again, there 
was no significant main effect of task and no significant interaction in any time bin. 
There was a significant main effect of DBS state in the third and fourth time bins (Bin 3: 
F(1,12) = 9.38, p = .01,  = .44; Bin 4: F(1,12) = 11.91, p = .005,  = .5).  
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BIN 1 BIN 2 BIN 3 BIN 4 
 
F(1,12) p F(1,12) p F(1,12) p F(1,12) p 
TASK 1.26 .28 4.02 .07 3.39 .09 3.73 .07 
STATE 3.01 .11 4.22 .06 9.38 .01* 11.91 .005* 
INTERACTION 1.74 .21 3.1 .1 5.42 .04 3.5 .09 
         
Table 3-3: Results of analysis of SD across trials at site FCz in experiment 3, across four time bins prior to 
action onset. Each bin represents a period of 500 ms. Alpha value for each comparison was .02 because of 
adjustment for four correlated comparisons. 
 
Figure 3-3: Amplitude SD at FCz before and after action (at 0) for W (top panel) and M (lower panel) 
judgements. Shaded areas represent standard errors. 
 
As the baseline was taken from the 10 ms period around action onset, variance in both 
conditions at time point 0 was necessarily 0. The observed decrease in variability in 
figure 3-3 arises partly from this manipulation of the data. However, the results of the 
statistical comparison indicate that this sudden drop in variability before the voluntary 
movement was more marked when DBS was OFF than DBS was ON. 
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Cluster-based permutation analysis 
No significant clusters were detected for amplitude data in either the W or the M 
judgement task. 
No significant clusters were detected in the across-trial variability data from the W 
judgement task. 
Three significant clusters were detected in the across-trial amplitude variability data 
from the M judgement task. All three clusters included a broad distribution of 
electrodes that, along with the inherent features of this type of analysis, prevents any 
strong assertions about localization of effect (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007). One cluster 
extended from -690 ms to -380 ms, another from -820 ms to -160 ms and another from -
140 ms to -28 ms (see figure 3-4). These time periods are consistent with the results of 
the ANOVAs described above. Interestingly, the cluster analysis found that this effect 
was specific to the M judgement task, while the ANOVAs found no significant task 
specificity. 
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Figure 3-4: Significant clusters detected in permutation analysis. Upper panels: shaded circles mark 
electrodes included in each cluster. Colour boldness represents the proportion of the total time period of the 
cluster that individual sites were significant (bolder colours represent a higher proportion of time). For 
illustrative purposes, the lower panels superimpose the time period of each cluster onto the plotted 
variability data from FCz. Note however that the permutation analysis included data from all sites.  
 
3.2.4. Discussion 
 
Behavioural data in this experiment did not provide evidence for an effect of DBS on W 
or M judgements. An effect was predicted based on the results of experiment 1 and the 
similar functional impact of DBS and dopaminergic medication. These interventions 
alleviate PD symptoms via different mechanisms and this difference may account for the 
lack of a detectable effect in the DBS cohort. However, the neurological data presented 
below suggest that DBS does influence pre-movement neural activity, so alterations in 
time perception while ON stimulation still seem plausible. Further experimental 
evidence from larger cohorts is recommended to adequately test this hypothesis. 
Comparison of the EEG recordings at site FCz showed that when DBS was ON, RP 
amplitude was significantly stronger, but only in the first premotor time bin. This early 
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difference in RP amplitude implies that the use of a baseline from around the time of 
action was indeed justified in this case. This suggests a disparity of RP onset, followed 
by a later convergence. Specifically, although RP amplitude was more negative in the 
OFF state in the early stage, the negative-going shift does not emerge clearly until 
around 1 s before the action. RP amplitude in the ON state already showed a 
characteristic negative going trend at 2 s before the action.  
The more negative amplitude generally in the early stage of the RP in the OFF condition 
may represent the effect of increased neural noise. This increased noise may have 
delayed or masked the characteristic negative-going phase until an unambiguous motor 
intention emerged. In the ON condition, this motor intention would have been detected 
earlier. These results therefore provide evidence for a candidate mechanism (RP onset 
shift) underlying earlier W and M judgements when DBS is active, as seen in experiment 
2. However this perceptual effect was not replicated in the behavioural data of this 
experiment, and the convergence of RPs occurred before the average time of W and M 
judgements. Further research is therefore required to determine the robustness of the 
effect and the precise timing of the implicated neural events. 
The analysis of across-trial variability showed that for both the W and M judgement 
tasks, the usual convergence of amplitude variability in the moments preceding a 
voluntary action was observed both in the OFF and ON conditions. Interestingly, in the 
M judgement task the late drop off in variance was significantly more marked in the OFF 
condition, due to variance remaining significantly higher during the very late stage of 
pre-motor activity. This delayed convergence may reflect a higher amount of noise 
generally when DBS is inactive, which is likely associated with the movement-related 
symptoms of PD.  
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It is tempting to suggest that the degree of convergence may be used as an index of a 
consistent precursor process of preparation for voluntary action. The earlier 
convergence seen in the ON condition might therefore seem to be a candidate 
explanation for the earlier W and M judgements observed in experiments 1 and 2. 
However there are two problems with this approach. Firstly, no effect of DBS was found 
in this experiment, so any association between EEG recordings here and the behavioural 
results in experiments 1 and 2 remains tenuous. Secondly, the difference in convergence 
was only observed in the M task in this experiment, so it cannot account for earlier W 
judgements.  
It remains unclear why the convergence difference was only found in the M judgement. 
One possible explanation is that the W judgement requires a greater degree of cognitive 
engagement: unlike for the M judgement, there is no physical change that can be sensed 
by the patient when considering the onset of intention. It has been shown that increased 
cognitive effort is associated with a reduction in variability (Manohar et al., 2015). In 
the present experiment, this effect may have driven reduced variability across 
conditions in the W task, masking or overriding any effect of stimulation. Indeed, the 
values displayed in figure 3-3 show that variability was remarkably consistent except in 
the M task when DBS was active. In this particular condition, cognitive effort was low, 
and variability was reduced only when DBS was active, possibly by alleviation of motor 
symptoms through a regulated basal-cortical drive. 
Taken together, the results of this experiment describe clear differences in neural 
activity in the moments preceding a voluntary action, depending on the presence or 
absence of deep brain stimulation. The characteristic negative phase of the RP appeared 
earlier and showed greater change in scalp potential when DBS was ON.  
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In the two motor bins immediately preceding the action, a characteristic reduction in 
variance occurred earlier when DBS was active than when inactive. In a cluster-based 
permutation analysis, this difference in variance was shown to be significantly different 
between conditions, across a broad range of central sites immediately before the onset 
of the action. These shifts in the shape of the RP were considered a candidate 
mechanism for the earlier W and M judgements observed when DBS was active in the 
previous chapter. However, this behavioural effect was not replicated in this sample, so 
this suggestion was rejected. Nevertheless, it is clear that using DBS to regulate the 
basal-cortical drive influenced the shape and behaviour of the characteristic RP during a 
Libet task. The behavioural manifestations of these changes remain to be more 
adequately determined in future research. 
The combined results of chapters 2 and 3 are further discussed below. 
3.3. Discussion of Chapters 2 & 3 
 
Chapter 2 showed that PD patients were able to complete a Libet task with performance 
and precision comparable to that of healthy controls. Interestingly, when patients were 
ON dopaminergic medication, they gave significantly earlier judgements of the 
perceived time of the intention to act, and of the action itself, than when OFF medication. 
A cross-experiment analysis also provided evidence that W and M judgements were 
both significantly earlier when patients were ON an intervention, regardless of what 
that intervention was. 
Chapter 3 attempted to detect the neural activity underlying this effect through an 
analysis of EEG recordings taken while patients completed the Libet task both OFF and 
ON DBS. The behavioural effect seen in chapter 2 did not replicate. However, activity 
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recorded at electrode site FCz and broadly across the central area showed that when 
patients were ON DBS, the characteristic negative phase of the RP was lengthened and 
showed a greater shift compared to RPs recorded when patients were OFF DBS. 
Furthermore, convergence of amplitude variability across trials showed an earlier drop-
off in the moments immediately preceding action onset.  
An earlier onset to the RP and reduced noise in the environment both predict earlier 
awareness of action and intention in a threshold model of action preparation (Hallett, 
2007). In this sense, it is tempting to conclude that the observed changes to the RP 
observed here drive the shift in perception described in experiments 1 and 2. However, 
RP change and earlier action awareness were not observed in the same cohort, so 
interpretation must be cautious.  
There was no healthy control group in experiment 2 or experiment 3 (see figure 2-1). 
Consequently there is no way to know whether it was the presence or absence of DBS 
that drove changes in the RP. It can only be stated that there was a difference between 
the two states.  Furthermore, the limited availability of DBS patients and the time 
required to complete the task – particularly when EEG was included – were factors that 
likely resulted in a lack of statistical power in experiments 2 and 3.   
The results obtained in these two chapters are consistent with a trend in the literature 
showing that disturbances of voluntary movement are accompanied by a delay in the 
awareness of both intentions and actions (Tabu et al., 2015; Moretto et al., 2011). The 
experiments described here provide further evidence from patients in both hypo- and 
hyper-dopaminergic states, or with motor symptoms alleviated or not by DBS. There 
was clear evidence from medication manipulations that the perceptual shift may be 
driven by dopamine availability, however the results were less conclusive for DBS.  
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The use of EEG in experiment 3 provided a valuable insight into the patterns of neural 
behaviour that precede a voluntary action in the presence or absence of DBS. 
Specifically, it was demonstrated that activation of DBS was associated with shape 
changes in the characteristic RP. These changes did not cause changes in action 
awareness. However, the activity observed does match predictions made by threshold 
models of motor preparation.  
Taken together, these results demonstrate that PD and its associated treatments 
continue to provide a unique and useful opportunity to investigate the neural 
mechanisms underlying voluntary action. Voluntary actions in PD will be further 
investigated in experiment 9, which focuses on the sense of agency (see section 7.2.). 
However it will first be necessary to introduce a novel paradigm that will be used to 
investigate the sense of agency in the following chapters.  
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Chapter 4: A novel paradigm combining reversal learning and 
intentional binding 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1. Limitations of previous Intentional Binding research 
 
Previous laboratory research on Sense of Agency (SoA) using Intentional Binding has 
often lacked ecological validity. Studies have typically investigated associations between 
a single action and a single outcome, without any significance or value for the 
participant (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002).  
Outside the laboratory, however, actions are embedded in a rich perceptual, affective 
and social landscape. People frequently select one action from several possible in a 
given situation, to achieve a desired goal. However, only a few studies have attempted 
to link sense of agency with outcome valence. In Takahata et al. (2012), participants’ 
actions caused tones that were associated with monetary rewards or penalties. They 
found reduced binding for penalty trials compared to neutral or rewarded trials. 
Similarly, Yoshie and Haggard (2013) found that negative sound outcomes were 
associated with a reduction in binding compared to neutral and positive sound 
outcomes. Neither study explored the effects of contingency between participants’ 
actions and the rewards received. When action choices lead to valenced outcomes, there 
is the possibility for learning, to maximise the benefit arising from one’s actions. The 
nature and strength of action-outcome associations formed in a learning context may 
differ strongly than associations formed in a more repetitive task. To investigate the 
intentional binding effect in a dynamic choice environment, this chapter introduces a 
novel paradigm that draws from research in goal-based decision-making. 
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4.1.2. Reversal Learning: an established paradigm for investigating goal-based 
decision-making. 
 
The novel paradigm presented in this thesis makes use of a probabilistic reversal 
learning approach (Rolls, 2000; Cools, Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002), which requires 
participants to continuously learn and update their action choices to align with 
changing action-outcome mappings. Typically, participants select between two options, 
one of which is more frequently rewarded. Periodically, the more favourable option and 
the less favourable option are inverted without the participant being made explicitly 
aware. To maximize rewards, participants must therefore monitor the outcome linked 
to each action, and then correctly update their expectations so as to select their next 
action accordingly (Sutton & Barto, 1991).  
A central issue in research on learning is how behaviour changes trial by trial in 
response to feedback (Daw, 2011). The outcomes in the paradigm described above are 
valenced: rewards are a positive outcome while non-rewards (or penalties) are negative. 
It was predicted that the valence of action outcomes might influence not only the 
intentional binding associated with a given outcome, but also the intentional binding 
reported on the subsequent trial. 
4.1.3. The need for a new paradigm. 
 
Despite the seemingly intuitive connection between the sense of agency and goal-based 
decision-making, these two research streams have largely evolved in separate 
experimental disciplines. Action intention and action selection have rarely been 
investigated together and there have seemingly been no experimental paradigms 
designed to study these associated experiences within a single task.  
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4.2. Experiment 4: Intentional binding and reward-based decision-
making. 
4.2.1. Introduction 
 
This experiment represents a preliminary and exploratory attempt to study the sense of 
agency within a goal-based decision-making context.  
The ‘Libet clock’ method was used to measure Intentional Binding (see section 1.3.5. for 
full description). This method has proven itself robust to replication (Moore & Obhi, 
2012) and allows for precise timing judgements to be made without any extensive 
training on the part of the participant. 
The voluntary action event and the sensory outcome of the Intentional Binding task 
were used as the essential elements in the probabilistic learning paradigm (Rolls, 2000; 
Cools, Clark, Owen, & Robbins, 2002). The voluntary action was made into a choice 
point, where one of two actions could be selected. The sensory outcome, either of two 
different tones (high or low frequency), indicated whether or not that action was 
rewarded. Further details are provided below. 
4.2.2. Methods 
 
All experiments in chapter 4 and 5 were approved by the UCL Research Ethics 
Committee.  
 
Participants 
Sixteen participants (9 female, all right-handed, mean age = 23 years, age range = 18-41 
years) completed the experiment and were paid £8/hour plus a bonus for correct 
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responses. Data from one participant was lost due to a technical error that corrupted a 
data file. All participants reported normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing. 
 
Procedure 
As in chapters 2 and 3, participants were seated at a standard computer keyboard and 
screen. They fixated a clock with a single rotating hand. The clock diameter was 20 mm 
and the hand rotated every 2560 ms.  
In baseline conditions, participants pressed a key at a time of their free choice, or heard 
an auditory tone at a random time. In ‘operant’ conditions, participants both pressed a 
key and heard a tone. The tone occurred 250 ms after the key press. Participants were 
instructed to wait for one full rotation of the clock before pressing the key. Tones were 
either high (2000 Hz) or low (500 Hz) in frequency, and lasted 100 ms. The high tone 
was always the ‘correct’ tone, and was associated with a monetary reward. The ‘F’ and ‘J’ 
keys of a standard keyboard were used for left and right hand responses. 
Following the tone (or the key press if no tone), the clock hand continued to rotate for a 
random interval between 1100 ms and 2800 ms, and then disappeared. In one block, 
participants reported the time that they pressed the button. In another block, they 
reported the time that they heard the tone. They used the keyboard to enter their 
judgement. 
 
Baseline action and outcome measures were first taken in six separate blocks in 
pseudorandom order. In three action baselines blocks, participants pressed the key 
with their left, right or freely chosen hand, according to block. No tone was played. 
Participants then estimated the time they pressed the key. In three outcome baseline 
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blocks, participants did not press a key, but heard a high, low or randomly mixed (high 
or low) tone, according to block. They then estimated the time that the tone was played.  
Next, participants completed two counterbalanced ‘operant’ blocks. In each operant 
block, one key delivered rewarded high tones with a probability of 0.8 and the other key 
with a probability of 0.2. The mapping was maintained across a run of trials, until the 
participant had selected the more rewarding key between five and seven times 
consecutively (randomized). Probability mappings then reversed. Nine such reversals 
occurred in each block, so each block involved ten ‘runs’ of responses. The actual 
number of trials per block depended on how rapidly each participant learned the 
‘correct’ key. 
Participants were explicitly told that the two keys had different probabilities of reward 
but were not told the exact probability values. They were informed that neither key 
would ever be a guaranteed win or loss (i.e. probability of reward was always less than 
1 and greater than 0). Participants were also told that the probabilities would 
occasionally reverse, but were not told how often or under what circumstances. 
The cumulative total of rewarded trials was displayed at the end of each trial. At the end 
of each block, all participants were told they had reached the threshold number of 
rewarded trials required to trigger a bonus.  In fact, this threshold was fictitious, and a 
bonus of £3 for each block was paid at the end of the experiment. This arrangement 
ensured that participants were not overpaid for prolonging the experiment by 
repeatedly making incorrect responses. 
At the end of each trial, a visual feedback indicating either reward (tick) or non-reward 
(cross) was presented after each judgement. The visual signal recapitulated the 
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information previously conveyed by the auditory tone, but was included to facilitate 
decision-making on the next trial, without placing strong demands on memory. 
All six baseline conditions were then repeated in reverse order. 
Analysis of baseline trials 
No significant differences were observed in the perceived times of key presses in 
milliseconds for left and right hand responses, forced- or free-choice, or for pre- or post-
experiment blocks measures (p > .05 for all comparisons). Consequently, all action 
baseline blocks were collapsed in further analysis. 
No significant differences were observed in the perceived times of high and low 
frequency auditory tones, for mixed or repeated presentation or for pre- or post-test 
measures (p > .05 for all comparisons). Consequently, these were also collapsed in 
further analysis. 
Analysis of operant trials 
Perceptual shifts were calculated for each participant and each condition by subtracting 
the relevant mean baseline error for actions or tones from that in operant trials. A 
positive action binding measure therefore corresponds to a shift of the perceived time 
of the action towards its outcome and a negative outcome binding measure to a shift of 
the perceived time of the outcome towards the action.  
Operant trials were categorized according to two design factors: 1. whether the 
outcome received on the current trial was rewarded (high tone) or not rewarded (low 
tone), 2. whether feedback on the previous trial was rewarded or not rewarded.  
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4.2.3. Results 
 
Performance 
The overall ratio of trials with non-rewarded outcomes to rewarded outcomes was 
0.6:1 (mean number of trials per block = 109, SD = 35).  
Participants learned the action-outcome contingencies. The criterion for advancement 
was set at five to seven presses of the more rewarded key, so performance was 
necessarily 100% before reversal of action-outcome mappings. Reversal events 
unsurprisingly triggered errors. The proportion of correct choices was submitted to a 
repeated-measure ANOVA with trial number after reversal as a factor (up to 5 trials). 
The trial number had a significant effect on participants’ performance (F(4,56) = 66.2, p 
< .001,  = .250), see figure 4-1.  As the figure shows, participants adapted their 
responses after a few reversal-induced errors occurred. 
 
Figure 4-1. Proportion of correct responses after a reversal event in experiment 4. Reproduced from Di Costa, 
Théro, Chambon, & Haggard (2017) 
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Intentional binding 
 
Action binding data were submitted to a 2x2 ANOVA with factors of current outcome 
valence (rewarded or not rewarded), and previous outcome valence. There was a highly 
significant effect of previous outcome valence (F(1,14) = 9.2, p = .009,  = .397), with 
stronger action binding following a non-rewarded outcome than following a rewarded 
outcome.  There was no effect of current outcome valence (F(1,14) = 1.72, p = .21,  
= .110), and no interaction (F(1,14) = .01, p > 0.25,  = .000).  
 
A similar ANOVA was performed for outcome binding.  This showed a significant effect 
of current outcome valence (F(1,14) = 6.32, p = .025,  = .311), with non-rewarded 
outcomes being more strongly bound towards actions than rewarded outcomes.  There 
was no effect of previous outcome valence (F(1,14) = .02, p = .89,  = .002), and no 
interaction (F(1,14) = 1.89, p = .19,  = .119). 
Action and outcome binding data are shown in figure 4-2.  
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Figure 4-2. Outcome and action binding in experiment 4. Error bars represent standard errors. Reproduced 
from Di Costa, Théro, Chambon, & Haggard (2017) 
 
4.2.4. Discussion 
 
In a reversal-learning task, non-rewarded outcomes were more strongly bound back to 
their actions than rewarded outcomes. These results therefore differ markedly from 
previous studies of binding and valence (Takahata et al., 2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013), 
in which non-rewarded outcomes showed less binding than rewarded or neutral 
outcomes.  This difference may reflect the presence of learning and selection in reward-
based decision-making in the current paradigm, which was absent in those previous 
studies.   
Further, action binding on the trial following a non-rewarded outcome was stronger 
than following a rewarded outcome. This is the first time that previous trial outcome is 
reported to have a sequential effect on action binding.  
Participants often – but not always – switched keys after an error. It was therefore 
important to establish that the observed post-error effect from an effect of performing a 
novel action. A simple linear regression model was fitted to the action binding data, 
with the following factors: whether or not participants switched keys (β1), whether or 
not the previous trial was rewarded or not (β2) and the interaction (β4), as well as an 
error term. 
Action Binding = β3 * Interaction + β1 * Switch + β2 * PreviousReward + β4 
The switch and interaction factors (β1 and β3) were both non-significant, while 
previous trial reward was significant (p = .02). These results indicate that the observed 
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difference in action binding is more likely explained by the previous trial feedback, than 
by whether or not the participant switched keys. 
Engbert and Wohlschläger (2007) showed that action binding reflects learning and 
prediction processes. The following experiment therefore aimed to replicate this post-
error boost of action binding and demonstrate that it is strongest in contexts where 
learning can be used to maximize reward.  
4.3. Experiment 5: Influence of more or less ambiguous learning 
environment 
4.3.1. Introduction 
 
The previous experiment revealed two effects of interest. Firstly, non-rewarded 
outcomes were more strongly bound to their actions. This effect was in contrast to 
predictions made from previous work. This experiment therefore aims to replicate the 
effect.  
Secondly, actions on trials following non-rewarded outcomes were more strongly 
bound to their outcomes. This experiment aims to replicate this effect and investigate if 
this sequential influence is associated with participants’ ability to learn from outcomes.  
In this experiment, the novel paradigm described in experiment 4 was used again. 
However the reward contingency of the two options was further manipulated. In 
different conditions, it was made more or less easy for participants to use outcomes to 
inform their action selection. This was achieved by altering the reliability of an outcome 
given a particular choice. If the effects observed in the previous experiment were indeed 
associated with learning, binding should be stronger in the easier condition of this 
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experiment, in which actions predict outcomes more reliably than in the more difficult 
condition. 
4.3.2. Methods 
 
Participants 
Sixteen participants (11 female, all right-handed, mean age = 22 years, age range = 18-
48 years) completed the experiment and were paid £7.50/hour plus a bonus for correct 
responses. All participants reported normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing. 
 
Procedure 
The design was based on the paradigm described in experiment 4, with some 
adjustments. Participants completed two blocks of trials (easy/hard) for each type of 
judgement (action/outcome) for a total of four blocks. In ‘easy’ blocks, one key 
delivered rewards with a probability of 0.9 and the other with a probability of 0.1. In 
‘hard’ blocks, one key delivered rewards with a probability of 0.7 and the other with a 
probability of 0.3. 
Analysis of baseline trials 
No significant differences were observed in the perceived times of key presses in 
milliseconds for left and right hand responses, forced- or free-choice, or for pre- or post-
experiment blocks measures (p > .05 for all comparisons). Consequently, all action 
baseline blocks were collapsed in further analysis. 
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Analysis of operant trials 
Perceptual shifts were calculated as in experiment 4. In addition to the factors of 
previous and current trial outcome, the factor of reward contingency was included 
(easy/hard). 
4.3.3. Results 
 
Performance 
As in experiment 4, participants learned the action-outcome contingencies (see figure 4-
3). Reversal events triggered errors and participants then adapted their responses after 
a few reversal-induced errors occurred and quickly returned to a plateau of sustained 
performance. It is worth noting that this plateau was at approximately 90% for the easy 
condition and 70% for the difficult condition, in line with the probability matching law 
(Vulkan, 2000). 
 
Figure 4-3. Proportion of correct responses before and after a reversal event in experiment 5. 
 
Action binding data were submitted to a 2x2 ANOVA with factors of current outcome 
valence (rewarded or non-rewarded), previous outcome valence and reward 
contingency (easy/hard). There was no significant effect of previous outcome valence 
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(F(1,15) = 1.77, p = .203,  = .105), no effect of current outcome valence (F(1,15) = .188, p 
= .67,  = .11), and no effect of reward contingency (F(1,15) = 3.54, p = .079,  = .191). 
All interactions were non-significant (p > .05).  
A similar analysis was performed for tone binding. Data were submitted to a 2x2 
ANOVA with factors as above. There was no significant effect of previous outcome 
valence (F(1,15) = .019, p = .893,  = .001), no effect of current outcome valence (F(1,15) = 
2.7, p = .121,  = .153), and no effect of reward contingency (F(1,15) = .061, p = .809,  
= .004). All interactions were non-significant (p > .05). 
To determine if the effects observed in the previous experiment were replicated across 
the experiment, binding results were directly compared across difficulty conditions. 
Action binding was tested through paired t-tests on the pooled conditions. The previous 
outcome valence had a significant effect on action binding (t(15) = 2.28, p = .038), with 
stronger action binding following a non-rewarded outcome than following a rewarded 
outcome. 
Data were also pooled across reward contingency for outcome binding. The current 
outcome valence had a significant effect on outcome binding (t(15) = -2.40, p = .03), with 
non-rewarded outcomes being more strongly bound towards actions than rewarded 
outcomes. 
Action and outcome binding data from pooled results are shown in figure 4-4. 
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Figure 4-4. Outcome and action binding in experiment 5. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
4.3.4. Discussion 
 
The purpose of experiment 5 was to examine the effect of a more or less reliable reward 
contingency on SoA. The experiment also attempted to replicate two effects from 
experiment 4: an effect of previous trial outcome valence on action binding, and an 
effect of current trial outcome valence on outcome binding.  
When data were separated by reward contingency the effects of outcome valence on 
outcome binding (current trial) and action binding (subsequent trial) did not replicate. 
However, an analysis of the pooled data did reveal significant effects, consistent with 
those observed in experiment 4.  
There was no significant effect of reward contingency on action or tone binding. Implicit 
measures of binding were therefore insensitive to the perceived reliability of action 
alternatives in this experiment. One explanation for the lack of effect may be that the 
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levels of the difficulty manipulation were not distinct enough. A third experiment 
therefore compared intentional binding in learning and non-learning conditions. 
4.4. Experiment 6: Influence of a learning context 
4.4.1. Introduction 
 
This experiment was again based on the paradigm introduced in experiment 4.  
In experiment 6, the degree of difficulty was not manipulated, but a ‘non-learning’ 
condition was included. In this condition, participants made actions and received 
outcomes as before, but action-outcome mappings were now entirely unpredictable. 
Participants were explicitly told about the nature of these two conditions. Stronger 
action binding was predicted in the learning condition compared to the random 
condition. 
4.4.2. Method 
 
Participants 
Thirty participants (21 females, all right-handed, mean age = 28 years, age range = 21-
53 years) completed the experiment and were paid £7.5/hour plus a bonus for correct 
responses and precision. The number of participants was increased, compared to 
experiment 4, to allow us to correlate intentional binding measures with learning 
measures across participants.  
General procedure 
The general procedure was similar to experiment 4, except for the following: here the 
keys used to select an action were the ‘right-arrow’ and ‘left-arrow’ keys of a standard 
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keyboard, using the index and middle fingers of the right hand respectively. Participants 
reported the time by typing on the keyboard with their left hand. No visual feedback 
was presented following timing judgements as participant reports from experiments 4 
and 5 indicated that they did not particularly attend to the visual feedback.  Because it 
was redundant with the tone frequency, it was omitted in experiment 6.  
This experiment only investigated action binding, and not tone binding, as action 
binding has been linked to outcome prediction mechanisms (Engbert & Wohlschläger, 
2007) and to experience-dependent plasticity (Moore & Haggard, 2008). Further, 
excluding tone binding allowed us to increase the trial numbers in agency blocks 
without making the experiment excessively long. 
Agency conditions 
Besides the usual baseline measures, participants completed 5 blocks of 30 trials in the 
learning condition, and 5 in the chance condition, in pseudo-randomized order. As in 
experiment 4, in the learning condition one key delivered rewarded high tones with a 
probability of 0.8 and the other key with probability of 0.2. The high tone was always 
the ‘correct’ tone, and participants were told to learn which key was most frequently 
associated with the high tone. Participants were explicitly informed that reversals of the 
action-tone mapping would occur occasionally and unpredictably. These explicit 
instructions aimed to reduce the high inter-individual variability in performance found 
in experiment 4, by clarifying the task for poorer performers. Further, reversals now 
occurred after a variable number of trials (randomly either 6, 10 or 14 trials) so 
participants could not predict when they would occur. Run length was adjusted after 
the last reversal in the block to ensure the same number of trials for each participant. At 
the end of each block of the learning condition, if participants achieved a threshold of at 
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least 20 rewarded trials, they gained a bonus of 50p. A large blockwise reward was used 
in place of smaller trialwise rewards to avoid satiety after several successful trials, and 
to maintain motivation throughout. 
In the random condition, the probability of hearing a high tone or a low tone was 
unrelated to the key chosen (50%/50%). Participants were explicitly told that their 
choice of action would not influence the tones they would hear. In the learning 
condition they were instructed to “find the good key, maximizing the number of high 
tones” while in the random condition they were told, “whichever action is chosen, it will 
have no influence on the following tone”. Since learning could not be used to maximize 
reward in this condition, the number of high-tone trials did not lead to a monetary 
bonus. This arrangement ensured that participants were not incentivised to search for 
contingencies that did not exist. Although this creates a motivational difference between 
the two conditions, this bias is intrinsic to any reinforcement learning experiment 
(O’Doherty, 2014). Furthermore, at the beginning of each block, participants were 
explicitly told which condition they were in. 
As before, participants reported the timing of their action. To further improve the 
precision of the measure, participants were instructed that at the end of each block they 
would receive an additional 25p if they improved the precision of timing estimates 
relative to the previous block. The standard deviation of their judgement errors was 
used to measure precision – note that this measure is independent of the mean timing 
judgement, and thus independent of action binding estimates. Therefore, in the learning 
condition, participants were rewarded for precision of timing judgements and for 
choosing the ‘correct’ key. In the chance condition, they were rewarded only for 
precision of timing judgements. 
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Baseline measures 
Baseline conditions were the same as the action baseline conditions of experiment 4. 
Participants performed 2 baseline blocks of 20 trials each, at the beginning and end of 
the agency session. In baseline blocks, participants freely chose which of the two keys to 
press. No significant differences were observed in the perceived times of key presses in 
milliseconds for left and right hand responses (F(1,29) = 1.01, p = .319,  = .018) or for 
pre- or post-experiment blocks measures (F(1,29) = .129, p = .721,  = .002). 
Consequently, all baseline blocks were collapsed in further analysis. 
Analysis 
Action binding was calculated for each participant and each condition by subtracting 
the relevant mean baseline error from the error in agency trials. Agency trials were 
categorised according to three design factors: 1. whether the outcome on a given trial 
was a high or low frequency tone (associated with a rewarded or non-rewarded 
outcome respectively in the learning condition) 2. whether the trial was in the learning 
or random condition and 3. whether the outcome on the previous trial was a high or low 
frequency tone. Action binding data were then subjected to a 2x2x2 ANOVA. 
4.4.3. Results 
 
Performance 
In the learning condition, participants demonstrated an ability to learn the correct 
action. As in experiment 4, the trial number after reversal had a significant effect on 
participants’ proportion of correct choice (F(5,145) = 57.14, p < .001 ,  = .2). They 
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quickly returned to initial performance levels after a reversal event (see figure 4-6 in 
section 4.5.3. below).  
Action binding 
Action binding data are shown in figure 4-5.  A 2x2x2 ANOVA revealed a highly 
significant main effect of condition, with stronger action binding in the learning 
condition compared to the chance condition (F(1,29) = 17.48, p < .001,  = .376). There 
was no effect of current trial outcome (F(1,29) = .02, p = .896,  = .001). Importantly, 
there was a significant main effect of previous trial outcome (F(1,29) = 14.56, p < .001,  
= .334) and also a highly significant interaction between learning condition and 
previous trial outcome (F(1,29) = 9.71, p = .004,  = .251).  
Simple-effect t-tests were used to further investigate this interaction. In the learning 
condition, non-rewarded outcomes significantly increased the action binding on the 
following trial compared to rewarded outcomes (simple-effect paired t-test: t(29) = 3.73, 
p < .001, Cohen’s d = .685). This difference was numerically almost abolished, and 
became statistically non-significant, in the chance condition (t(29) = .46, p = .65; see 
figure 4-5).  
No other interactions were significant (current trial outcome x condition: F(1,29) = .33, p 
= .57,  = .011; current trial outcome x previous trial outcome: F(1,29) = 1.01, p = .32,  
= .034; current trial outcome x condition x previous trial outcome: F(1,29) = 0.13, p = .72, 
 = .005). 
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Figure 4-5. Mean action binding in ms following a rewarded (light grey) or non-rewarded (dark grey) 
outcome on the previous trial, for both chance and learning conditions. Error bars represent standard errors. 
Note that the high/low tones were associated with rewarded/non-rewarded outcome in the learning 
condition, but not in the chance condition. *** p < 0.001. Reproduced from Di Costa, Théro, Chambon, & 
Haggard (2017) 
 
4.4.4. Discussion 
 
With some changes in implementation, the post-error boost in action binding was 
replicated in the learning condition. Crucially, this effect was specific to this condition, 
and absent when participants could not learn stable action-outcome relations. These 
results therefore provide strong evidence that action binding reflects the ability to 
influence events through learning to improve one’s own action choices.  Critically, this 
learning depends on previous error feedback. 
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To further investigate this effect, a formal reinforcement learning model was used to 
investigate how the post-error boost in action binding is related to how people learn to 
maximize rewards.  
4.5. Statistical Modelling of results from experiments 4 and 6. 
4.5.1. Introduction 
 
Consistent effects of learning were only obtained in experiments 1 and 3, thus only data 
from these experiments was modelled in this section. 
Reinforcement learning models distinguish between the learning opportunities offered 
by errors and by rewards respectively.  Interestingly, these two elements of learning are 
differentially expressed across the population.  Negative learners are better at avoiding 
negative outcomes while positive learners are better at choosing positive outcomes.  
Interestingly, the EEG feedback-related negativity (FRN) evoked by an error signal was 
found to be larger in negative learners than positive learners (Frank, Woroch, & Curran, 
2005). In the following analysis, it was predicted that the post-error boost in action 
binding might be positively correlated with participants’ bias to learn more from 
negative than from positive outcomes. 
4.5.2. Method and model 
 
An established model of reinforcement learning was fitted to investigate whether inter-
individual variance in asymmetric learning is correlated to the post-error boost in 
action binding. According to the reinforcement-learning algorithm, each of the possible 
actions (choosing the left or right button) was associated with an internal value called 
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an action value (Sutton & Barto, 1991). The values themselves are hidden, but are 
thought to drive choices between alternative actions. 
Value updating 
The model is based on the concept of prediction error, which measures the discrepancy 
between actual outcome value and the expected outcome for the chosen action (i.e. the 
chosen action value): 
δ(t) = Outcome(t) − Valuechosen(t) 
Prediction error is then used to update the value of the chosen action. The values were 
set as 0.5 at the beginning of each block. As this analysis was concerned with the specific 
effect of rewarded and non-rewarded outcomes, two different learning rates, α+ and α-, 
were calculated to reflect different updating processes after a positive or negative 
prediction error (Lefebvre et al., 2016, Niv, Edlund, Dayan, & O’Doherty 2012). This 
asymmetrical model therefore accounts for individual differences in the way 
participants learn from positive and negative outcomes: 
Valuechosen(t + 1) =  Valuechosen(t) + {
α+   ×  δ(t)  if δ(t) > 0
α−   ×  δ(t)  if δ(t) < 0
 
The action values of the two possible actions were normalized by keeping their sum 
constant. 
A reduced model was also constructed with only one learning rate for both rewarded 
and non-rewarded outcomes. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) comparison 
showed that the BIC of the two learning rate model was significantly lower than the one 
rate learning model in experiment 4 (paired t-test : t(15) = 2.98, p = .01) but not 
experiment 6 (paired t-test : t(29) = 1.003, p = .32). However, the Aikake Information 
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Criterion (AIC) comparison showed that the AIC of the two learning rate model was 
significantly lower than the AIC of the one learning rate model for both experiment 4 
(paired t-test : t(14) = 4.56, p < .001) and experiment 6 (t(29) = 2.37, p = .025). The model 
with two learning rates (α+ and α-) was thus considered the best fitting model.  
In experiment 4, the chosen model (two learning rates) better predicted the data 10 
participants, while the alternative model (with one learning rate) better predicted the 
data of 5 participants. In experiment 6, the chosen model outperformed the alternative 
for all 30 participants. 
Decision rule 
In the model, the action with the higher action value is more likely to be selected. The 
probability to choose an action will depend on the two action values and on the “inverse 
temperature” parameter β, which represents the strength of the action values’ effect on 
action selection: 
Pchoosing Left =
eβ × ValueLeft
e β × ValueLeft  +   e β × ValueRight
 
Parameter fitting and simulations 
The model parameters were fitted based on participants’ choices on each trial. The 
three parameters fitted were: the two learning rates, α+ and α-, and the inverse 
temperature β. They were fitted independently for each participant, on the data from 
the learning condition in experiments 4 and 6. The best parameters chosen were those 
that maximized log likelihood (LLH), defined as the sum of the log of the model’s fit to 
participant’s action choices. Thus, LLH values close to 0 indicate a good model fit. A 
splice sampling procedure was used to test the different possible combinations of 
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parameters (Bishop, 2006). More precisely, using three different starting points drawn 
from uniform distributions for each parameter, 10,000 iterations of a gradient ascent 
algorithm were performed to converge on the set of three parameters that best fitted 
the data. 
 
4.5.3. Modelling results and discussion 
 
In experiment 4, the mean learning rates (α+ and α-) across participants were, 
respectively, .89 and .48 and the mean inverse temperature (β) was 3.65. In experiment 
6, the mean learning rates (α+ and α-) across participants were, respectively, .67 and .51 
and the mean inverse temperature (β) was 4.71. 
From the fitted parameters, the simulated model’s choices were a generally good match 
with participants’ behaviour, see figure 4-6. The mean probability of the model selecting 
the same action as the participant was as follows: experiment 4: M = .73, SD = .07; 
experiment 6: M = .76, SD = .09). Thus the reinforcement-learning model seemed to 
accurately reflect participants’ learning processes. Similarly to Lefebvre et al. (2016), 
overall higher learning rates were found for rewarded outcomes than for non-rewarded 
outcomes (experiment 4: α+ M = .89, SD = .13, α- M = .48, SD = .14, paired t-tests, t(14) = 
9.15, p < .001; experiment 6: α+ M = .67, SD = .27, α- M = .51, SD = .23, t(29) = 3.26, p 
= .003), justifying the use of an asymmetrical model.  
The normalized learning rate asymmetry (Lefebvre et al., 2016; Niv et al., 2012), defined 
as (α− −  α+) (α− +  α+)⁄  was calculated to investigate whether the post-error agency 
boost could be related to the outcome-specific learning-rate. The post-error boost in 
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action binding was defined as the difference between action binding after a non-
rewarded outcome and action binding after a rewarded outcome, as before. For 
experiment 4, there was no relation between post-error agency boost and normalized 
learning rate asymmetry (t(13) = -.66, p = .518, R2 = .03).  However, there was a positive 
correlation between post-error agency boost and normalized learning rate asymmetry 
in the learning condition of experiment 6, (t(28) = 5.6, p = .026, R2 = .17, see figure 4-6), 
implying that individuals who learn from errors also show a strong post-error agency 
boost.  The absence of any effect in experiment 4 may reflect the lower statistical power, 
and may also reflect the very restricted inter-individual variability in learning rate 
asymmetry (asymmetry in experiment 4: M = -.31, SD = .14; in experiment 6: M = -.15, 
SD = .32). 
Finally, it was considered whether other confounding factors, in addition to normalized 
learning rate asymmetry, could predict individual variability in post-error agency boost 
in experiment 6. In particular, one alternative view hypothesizes that the post-error 
agency boost could merely reflect saliency of rare error events, akin to the non-specific 
alerting effect of an oddball, rather than any relation between errors and learning.  This 
alternative model also predicts a negative relation between an individual’s post-error 
agency boost and the frequency of their errors, yet no such relation was found (t(28) 
= .53, p = .603, R2 < .001), and the sign was not as predicted. The general influence of 
contingency is further explored in the following chapter. 
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Figure 4-6: Proportion of correct responses before and after a reversal event for experiments 4 (left panel) 
and 6 (right panel). Participants’ data are in black and predictions of the reinforcement learning model are in 
grey. B. Post-error boost in action binding plotted against the normalized learning rate asymmetry for 
Experiment 6. Reproduced from Di Costa, Théro, Chambon, & Haggard (2017) 
4.6. General Discussion 
 
4.6.1. Chapter overview 
 
Experiments in this chapter examined two measures of intentional binding: the binding 
of actions toward their consequences and the binding of outcomes/tones back towards 
the events that caused them, in both learning and non-learning contexts. 
Exp 4 Exp 6 
Exp 6 
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4.6.2. Outcome/Tone binding 
 
With regard to outcome binding, experiment 6 replicated the difference in outcome 
binding found in experiment 4. Outcome binding was stronger in non-rewarded trials 
compared to rewarded trials. This effect was small and contrary to previous results 
(Yoshie & Haggard, 2013; Takahata et al., 2012) so its meaning remains unclear.  Those 
studies suggested that the well-known self-serving bias (Bandura, 1989) might 
influence not only explicit attributions of agency, but also implicit measures of the basic 
experience of agency.  However, the studies presented in this chapter add an additional, 
important element of learning, which those earlier studies lacked.  The effects of 
learning from errors appear to replace or outweigh the effects of valence. In the novel 
paradigm presented here, errors provided important evidence for learning what action 
to perform next.  In contrast, the valence of outcomes in previous experiments was 
completely predictable, and unrelated to action choices. The observed effects of valence 
on outcome binding were not replicated in any further experiments in this thesis and 
are not discussed further. 
4.6.3. Action binding 
 
In all three experiments presented in this chapter, actions were more strongly bound 
towards their outcomes following a non-rewarded trial.  This effect was observed 
wherever learning could be used to maximise outcomes. In the non-learning condition 
of experiment 6, participants were explicitly told that they would not be able to 
maximise rewards through learning and no post-error effect was observed. 
One may therefore consider that the post-error boost to the sense of agency is indeed a 
feature of learning. Information provided by prediction errors is only useful if another 
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attempt will be made to achieve the same goal. It therefore follows that the effect of 
errors on the sense of agency would only be observed in a learning context, as 
demonstrated in experiment 6. The reliability of prediction errors, as manipulated in 
experiment 5, might inform the selection of actions, but not necessarily alter the feeling 
of control over the actions themselves. 
4.6.4. The post-error agency boost – potential explanations 
 
The concept of ‘cognitive control’ refers to the control and monitoring of cognitive 
resources to achieve successful task performance.  Errors signal a failure of effective 
control, and trigger a number of adaptations, notably ‘post-error slowing’ (Danielmeier 
& Ullsperger, 2011).  Post-error slowing is classically associated with increased caution 
in action selection after errors (Dutilh et al., 2012).  The relation between the post-error 
agency boost and post-error slowing remains unclear.  However, it seems unlikely that a 
mere transient increase in availability of general cognitive resources devoted to action 
selection, as suggested by conflict adaptation theories, can explain the increase in post-
error action binding.  A general boost in attention following an error would be expected 
to cause a general increase in precision of timing judgements, reducing judgement 
errors, and therefore reducing both action binding and tone binding effects – yet a 
specific increase in judgement errors was observed for actions only.  Instead, the post-
error boost may reflect a specific strategic adaptation to the information value of the 
trial following an error.  This adaptation reflects the fact that errors may be highly 
informative for future actions. Strongly linking actions to outcomes on the trial 
following an error may be important for guiding future action choices.  
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4.6.5. Potential confound of frequency 
 
One may argue that the post-error agency boost could merely reflect saliency of rare 
error events, akin to the non-specific alerting effect of an oddball, rather than any 
relation between errors and learning. This alternative model predicts a relation 
between an individual’s post-error agency boost and the frequency of errors. No such 
effect was observed in the experiments presented here. Nevertheless this potential 
confound, and related questions, are explored more thoroughly in chapter 5.  
4.7. The post-error agency boost – preliminary conclusions 
 
Taken overall, cognitive control mechanisms engaged when people make errors may 
have two distinct effects: an increase in cognitive resources to restore performance, and 
an increase in the experiential link between action and outcome.  The latter effect could 
trigger a post-error boost in agency.  However, the studies presented here cannot 
identify for certain the direction of any causal relation between the post-error agency 
boost and learning from errors. 
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Chapter 5: Influence of frequency and predictability of outcomes in 
the novel paradigm 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter will investigate two questions that arise from the preliminary work 
described in chapter 4.  
Experiment 7 examined the potential influence of outcome frequency as a potential 
confound. In the preceding experiments, rewarded trials appeared more frequently 
than non-rewarded trials, as participants learned to produce the more-rewarded action. 
Stronger binding for negative compared to positive outcomes could potentially be due 
to familiarity, rather than reward value.  Experiment 7 was designed to control for this 
alternative possibility.  
Experiment 8 investigated the nature of the mechanisms underlying the binding effects 
observed thus far. Time judgments in intentional binding tasks are typically given after 
the participant has been made aware of the outcome. It is therefore possible that the 
nature (or mere presence) of the outcome influences participants’ perception 
retrospectively. This is a view favoured by many researchers (see for example Wegner 
& Wheatley, 1999). However, a prospective mechanism would have an influence on 
binding that is insensitive to the nature of the outcome. Indeed, any effects that are 
associated with this prospective mechanism should persist even in the absence of an 
anticipated outcome. This hypothesis is tested in experiment 8 (section 5.3. below). 
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5.2. Experiment 7. Testing the frequency confound hypothesis 
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
This experiment was designed to examine the potentially confounding effect of outcome 
familiarity in the novel paradigm described in chapter 4. Dummy trials were inserted 
into the trial schedule and matched negative trials in frequency but carried no 
information relevant to the task. It was predicted that action binding on trials following 
negative outcomes would be stronger than on dummy trials. It was also predicted that 
action binding on trials following negative outcomes would be stronger than on trials 
following positive outcomes, replicating the effects observed in experiment 4, 5 and 6. 
5.2.2. Method 
 
Participants 
Sixteen participants (9 female, all right-handed, mean age = 24 years, age range = 19-43 
years) completed the experiment and were paid £7.5/hour. All participants gave 
informed written consent prior to commencing the experiment. All participants 
reported normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing. 
Apparatus, design and analysis 
The experiment was based on experiment 4, however dummy trials were randomly 
inserted into the trial schedule. A dummy trial always produced a neutral tone, 
intermediate in frequency between those signalling reward (2000 Hz) or penalty (500 
Hz). Participants were instructed that dummy trials appeared randomly, and did not 
influence the probability of outcomes in following trials. The appearance of dummy 
trials was yoked to the occurrence of a penalised outcome but did not necessarily occur 
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immediately after. Penalised and dummy trials therefore occurred with precisely the 
same frequency within a block. 
To balance the valence of outcomes, successful trials were rewarded (10p) while 
unsuccessful trials incurred a penalty (-10p). Dummy trials were neither penalised nor 
rewarded. 
As in experiment 6, reversal events occurred automatically, every 6-8 trials. 
Participants completed six blocks of fifty trials for a total of 300 trials.  
Analysis of baseline trials 
No significant differences were observed in the perceived times of key presses in 
milliseconds for left and right hand responses, forced- or free-choice, or for pre- or post-
experiment blocks measures (p > .05 for all comparisons). Consequently, all action 
baseline blocks were collapsed in further analysis. 
Analysis of operant trials 
Perceptual shifts were calculated as in experiment 4. 
5.2.3. Results 
 
Simple paired t-tests were used to analyse the main effect of the previous outcome on 
action binding. Action binding following a penalty was significantly higher than action 
binding following a reward (t(15) = 2.6, p = .02, Cohen’s d = .64, see figure 5-1). Crucially, 
the difference between action binding following penalty and dummy outcomes was 
marginally significant (t(15) = 1.8, p = .09, d = .45, see figure 5-1). 
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Figure 5-1. Action binding in experiment 7. 
 
5.2.4. Discussion 
 
This experiment tested the possibility that stronger action binding following a negative 
reward might be driven by differences in frequency of exposure between more and less 
rewarding outcomes.  
Action binding following a penalty was stronger than following a rewarded outcome, 
replicating the post-error agency boost observed in Chapter 4. More importantly, 
although penalised outcomes and non-rewarded dummy outcomes occurred with the 
same frequency, penalised outcomes tended to produce more subsequent action 
binding than non-rewarded outcomes. Thus the effect of previous outcome valence on 
current action binding is not convincingly explained by an “oddball” effect. 
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5.3. Experiment 8: Testing for prospective mechanisms of the sense 
of agency. 
5.3.1. Introduction 
 
As discussed in the General Introduction to this thesis (section 1.4.5.), research has 
suggested that the mechanisms underpinning the sense of agency may be either 
prospective or retrospective in nature. Implicit measures such as intentional binding 
may therefore capture aspects of the sense of agency that are associated with signals 
preceding the goal-directed action, or signals that arise once the outcome of the action 
is known, or both. 
The post-error boost to action binding observed in four experiments thus far is a 
sequential effect. The novel paradigm described in this thesis therefore offers a new 
opportunity to investigate potential prospective influences on the sense of agency. If the 
post-error action boost is observed even in the absence of an anticipated outcome, one 
may conclude that prospective mechanisms cannot be ruled out as an explanation for 
the post-error action boost. Experiment 8 was designed to test this hypothesis, by 
including trials where the anticipated outcome does not occur. 
5.3.2. Method 
 
Participants 
Eighteen participants (13 female, all right-handed, mean age = 25 years, age range = 21-
51 years) completed the experiment and were paid £7.5/hour. All participants gave 
informed written consent prior to commencing the experiment. All participants 
reported normal or corrected to normal vision and hearing. 
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Apparatus, design and analysis 
This experiment was based on experiment 7, in which dummy trials were randomly 
inserted into the trial schedule, occurring with precisely the same frequency as 
penalised trials within each block. 
Furthermore, we varied the reliability of the outcome. On one third of all trials, the tone 
did not occur. Participants were simply asked to judge the time of their action, and the 
experiment continued.  
Note that in this experiment dummy outcomes are distinct from absent outcomes (see 
figure 5-2). 
 
 
Figure 5-2: Trial types in experiment 8. Left panel: on two thirds of trials, a tone is heard following the action 
event, according to a probability schedule Right panel: on one third of trials, no tone is heard following the 
action event. Note the distinction between a dummy trial (left, center) and a no-tone trial (right, top). 
TONE TRIALS NO TONE TRIALS 
TRIALS 
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Analysis of baseline trials 
No significant differences were observed in the perceived times of key presses in 
milliseconds for left and right hand responses, forced- or free-choice, or for pre- or post-
experiment blocks measures (p > .05 for all comparisons). Consequently, all action 
baseline blocks were collapsed in further analysis. 
 
Analysis of operant trials 
Action binding was significantly stronger following a negative (penalised) outcome than 
following a dummy outcome (t(17) = 2.15, p = .047), suggesting that frequency was not a 
confounding factor in action binding results and replicating the trend observed in 
experiment 7. All trials following a dummy outcome were therefore excluded. 
Furthermore, all trials following a trial with no tone were excluded. 
3.3.3. Results 
 
Action binding results were submitted to a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA with factors: 
previous trial feedback (rewarded/penalised) and current trial type (tone 
present/absent). Action binding was significantly stronger following a penalised trial 
than a rewarded trial (F(1,17) = 6.15, p = .02,  = .266). There was no effect of trial type 
on action binding (F(1,17) = .21, p = .65) but there was a significant interaction (F(17) = 
5.94, p = .026,  = .259). Post-hoc t-tests confirmed significantly more action binding 
after negative outcomes than after positive outcome in tone absent trials (t(17) = 2.99, p 
= .008) but not in tone present trials (t(17) = .06, p = .95), see figure 5-3.  
2
p
2
p
135 
 
 
Figure 5-3. Action binding in experiment 8.  
 
3.3.4. Discussion 
 
Experiment 8 was designed to investigate the mechanisms thought to underlie SoA. 
Specifically, anticipated but absent outcomes were used to probe the 
prospective/retrospective aspect of SoA, as measured with Intentional Binding.  
The presence or absence of outcomes did not have a significant effect on action binding 
results. There is therefore no evidence that the mechanisms under investigation are 
entirely retrospective.  
Indeed, the post-error boost to action binding described in previous experiments (and 
replicated here) was only detectable when the tone was absent. This was a surprising 
result, as the effect was expected to persist regardless of outcome presence or absence. 
The occurrence of outcomes in an unreliable environment may take on a greater 
associative importance, as the brain attempts to gather information while it is available. 
The salience of such outcomes may then efface the post-error agency boost, as seen here.  
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Results in this experiment suggest that the mechanisms giving rise to this effect are at 
least partly prospective. Although there is not yet a comprehensive understanding of the 
precise causes that give rise to agency, one can describe certain features of the 
implicated processes. The results obtained here rule out an entirely retrospective 
explanations. Furthermore, the use of the novel paradigm used here highlights an 
important environmental feature (outcome obtained) that can prospectively influence 
the subjective experience of future associated actions.  
5.4. General Discussion 
5.4.1. Results obtained in this chapter 
 
The previous chapter introduced a novel paradigm to study SoA. An intentional binding 
task was embedded in a reversal-learning environment. For the first time, sequential 
effects on binding were identified and described.  The two experiments described in this 
chapter were proposed to investigate the observed boost to action binding following a 
negative outcome. Experiment 7 was designed to control for the potentially 
confounding effect of outcome frequency. Experiment 8 made use of absent outcomes to 
delineate retrospective and prospective aspects to the sense of agency, including the 
effect described above. 
The relative infrequency of negative outcomes did not appear to be a convincing 
explanation for the post-error action boost. In both experiments, negative outcomes 
tended to produce more action binding than dummy outcomes, despite occurring with 
precisely the same frequency. 
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Furthermore, the post-error action boost arises from mechanisms that cannot be 
entirely retrospective in nature. In experiment 8, the effect was observed on trials 
where outcomes were anticipated but did not occur.  
3.4.2. Synthesis of results from Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
The capacity to choose between actions in order to obtain rewards seems essential to 
functional behaviour outside the laboratory, and the sense of agency would be an 
important experiential component of that capacity. The paradigm described here forced 
participants to continuously learn relations between actions and outcomes. Previous 
studies showed that intentional binding is sensitive to economic (Takahata et al., 2012) 
and affective (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013) valence, but these studies did not address 
learning and decision-making aspects. The paradigm introduced in chapter 4 has been 
used to demonstrate for the first time how outcome success or failure influences the 
sense of agency in a dynamic learning environment. 
While sense of agency is usually defined as the feeling of controlling one’s actions and 
their consequences (Haggard & Chambon, 2012), few studies have investigated the 
discriminative ability to control outcomes.  One suggested that action-outcome relations 
had no effect on intentional binding (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012).  Unlike 
previous studies, the experiments presented here involved an element of reward-based 
decision-making. Thus, it may be argued that action binding is a valid implicit measure 
of purposive outcome agency, i.e. the ability to generate one particular external event, 
rather than another, through one’s own motivated, endogenous action. 
People normally make actions for a reason. That is, they choose actions to achieve a 
desired outcome. They then monitor and evaluate whether the action succeeded or 
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failed in achieving the outcome. Thus, one might intuitively expect a link between 
adaptive behaviour and sense of agency, yet these two traditions in action control have 
evolved through largely separate research literatures. The data presented here suggest 
that when people experience negative outcomes, they feel more control, not less, in the 
next trial.  This may initially seem counterintuitive, but it is strongly consistent with the 
view that sense of agency is related to acquiring and maintaining control over external 
events. 
3.4.3. Conclusions regarding the post-error action boost 
 
SoA has an important functional role in adaptive behaviour. Negative feedback might 
increase participants’ feeling of agency for a short time, because action failures should 
strongly motivate the requirement to act appropriately in the future. SoA could be 
understood in the context of motivation to improve performance on subsequent actions. 
The reliability and general effect size of the post-error action boost will be subjected to 
meta-analysis, described in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Reliability and effect size of the post-error boost to 
sense of agency – a meta-analysis. 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the preceding two chapters, intentional binding was embedded in a reversal-learning 
task. It was observed that action binding was stronger on trials following an undesirable 
outcome, such as a monetary loss. It was speculated that this novel, sequential effect 
may be a marker of cognitive processes such as learning, error monitoring and action 
selection.  
  
In chapter 5, the effect proved robust to replication. It was also shown that the relative 
infrequency of negative outcomes was not a convincing explanation for the observed 
boost. However, it was also noted that the effect is quite unlike results from previous 
experiments using intentional binding and valenced outcomes (Yoshie & Haggard, 2013, 
Takahata et al., 2012). 
  
It is therefore prudent to consider the reliability and relative strength of the post-error 
boost using a formalised method of inter-study comparison. This chapter will examine 
the combined results of the experiments described in chapters 4 and 5, and other 
studies not described in full in this thesis, using meta-analysis. 
  
As a statistical tool, meta-analysis is more frequently employed for clinical trials than 
for laboratory experiments such as those described in this thesis. As a result, meta-
analysis is commonly used for between-subject designs more than for within-subject 
designs. This is an important consideration in the present work, as the effect size for a 
within-subject design can be calculated from the difference between the two conditions 
141 
 
of interest, whereas the effect size for between-subject designs is based on estimates of 
variability in each of the two conditions. Meta-analyses of within-subject studies 
typically report effect sizes based on between-subject effect sizes (Lakens, 2013). This is 
partly motivated by a desire for easy comparability with other meta-analyses but also 
because complete variability data is rarely provided in published reports of within-
subjects designs. Nevertheless, employing such methods may result in poorer estimates 
of effect size. 
Relevant to the present analysis, if the variability of a within-subjects experiment arises 
from factors common to all conditions, then the variability of difference scores may be 
substantially lower than the combined variance of individual conditions. A method of 
calculating error variance for between subject designs would therefore underestimate 
the within-subject effect size. Additionally, and unusually for a meta-analysis, all data 
from each experiment included here was available. Accordingly, the analysis described 
in this chapter will employ a measure of effect size recommended for within-subjects 
designs. Specifically, variability of difference scores is calculated using the average 
standard deviation of all conditions (Lakens, 2013). 
6.2. Method 
6.2.1. Study Selection for Multi-study analysis 
 
There are few studies that have been conducted using the same paradigm described in 
the present work. Previous studies using intentional binding could not be included due 
to the absence of any sequential dependency between trials. Similarly, previous reversal 
learning experiments have not employed intentional binding as a measure of agency 
and are not therefore comparable.  
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To be considered relevant, studies must have measured action binding as a dependant 
variable. Furthermore, it must have been possible for participants to learn from the 
outcome of an individual trial to improve performance on subsequent trials. Data from 
patient studies were excluded, as were experimental trials from brain stimulation 
experiments.  
All relevant studies from this thesis are included. A further experiment was included 
that was conducted by colleagues independently and in collaboration with the author. 
6.2.2. Description of studies 
 
Experiments from this thesis are described in full in their respective chapters. 
Experiments 4, 5 and 6 are described in chapter 4. Experiments 7 and 8 are described in 
chapter 6. The following experiment is not described in this thesis: 
Di Costa, Khalighinejad & Haggard (2016, unpublished): Design and execution as in 
experiment 7, however Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) was applied between 
trials. Only sham condition data are included here. 
6.2.3. Meta-analysis method 
 
A fixed effects meta-analysis was conducted using the steps described by Lipsey and 
Wilson (2001). Paired-sample t-tests were performed for each study, comparing action 
binding on trials following positive and negative outcomes. Effect sizes were obtained 
using Cohen’s dAV and corrected for sample size biases using Hedges’s GAV (Lakens, 2013). 
These measures are easily compared with between-subject effect size measures that 
may be more familiar. Furthermore, other effect size measures may provide 
conservative results when correlations are high across conditions (Lakens, 2013).  
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The purpose of this analysis was to determine the strength and reliability of an 
observed trend across experiments. The direction of effect was therefore known: 
binding was expected to increase following a negative outcome on the previous trial. Gav 
results across all studies were therefore submitted to a one-tailed Z-score test to 
determine difference from zero.  
The use of fixed- or random-effects analyses is an important statistical consideration 
(Hedges & Vevea, 1998). While fixed effects models assume that all experiments share a 
common effect size, random effects models assume that the effect size varies across 
experiments (Smith & Alloy, 2009). Previous meta-analyses of cognitive effects have 
argued in favour of fixed-effects models when the task and experimental environment 
were the same (see for example Horvath, Forte & Carter, 2015). A fixed-effects model 
was considered appropriate in the present analysis. All experiments were conducted in 
the same laboratory, using the same software to present stimuli. Although individual 
parameters varied by experiment, the fundamental design of the task remained the 
same. Lastly, subjects in each experiment were drawn from the same subject pool. It 
was therefore considered that reasonably homogenous results would be obtained. 
Cochran’s Q was used to investigate this assumption, by testing heterogeneity between 
experiments (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003).  
6.3. Results 
6.3.1. Descriptive data 
 
The data used in the meta-analysis are summarised in table 6-1. For each experiment, 
action binding results were extracted and categorized according to the outcome on the 
previous trial. Rewarded trials were considered ‘positive’ and penalties (or non-
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rewarded trials in experiments without penalties) were considered ‘negative’. Trials 
following a dummy or absent outcome (in experiments that included those features) 
were excluded.  
    Negative outcome on trial t-1 Positive outcome on trial t-1 
  N M SD M SD 
Experiment 4 15 87.24 62.84 62.98 49.23 
Experiment 5 16 50.38 52.11 44.25 48.58 
Experiment 6 30 41.57 57.16 22.00 53.75 
Experiment 7 16 19.73 199.61 -16.63 211.58 
Experiment 8 18 32.06 94.17 22.79 107.57 
Di Costa et al.  12 67.74 47.77 61.49 43.63 
Table 6-1: Sample size (N), Mean (M) and Standard Deviation (SD) in ms, of relevant conditions in all included 
experiments. 
 
6.3.2. Analysis of effect sizes 
 
The general impression that emerges from individual study results largely supports the 
concept of a post-error boost to the sense of agency, as measured with intentional 
binding. Statistical comparisons are summarised in table 6-2. Four of the six studies in 
the analysis showed a significant increase in action binding following a negative 
outcome when conditions were directly contrasted.  
  Observed effect Statistical test Effect size (GAV) 
Experiment 4 Significant increase  t(14) = 3.4, p = .005 .43 
Experiment 5 Significant increase  t(15) = 2.28, p = .038 .2 
Experiment 6 Significant increase  t(29) = 3.73, p < .001 .35 
Experiment 7 Significant increase  t(15) = 2.6, p = .02 .17 
Experiment 8 No significant result t(17) = 1.65, p = .117 .09 
Di Costa et al.  No significant result t(11) = 1.16, p = .27 .13 
Table 6-2. Effect of negative outcome on action binding on the following trial in all included experiments. 
 
The results obtained were then used to determine if there was statistical support for a 
general post-error boost to the sense of agency. Results were also used to investigate if 
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there was any heterogeneity between experiments beyond what could be expected from 
sampling error. 
A forest plot of the included studies and an overall effect size is shown in figure 6-1. 
Note that unlike the paired-sample t-tests, the recommended statistic in the meta-
analysis (Gav) is insensitive to the correlation between samples. Consequently, the plot 
shows confidence intervals that include zero (Lakens, 2013).  
 
Figure 6-1. Forest plot of results from individual studies and overall effect size. Note that the recommended 
statistic (Gav) is insensitive to the correlation between samples. Consequently, the plot shows confidence 
intervals that include zero. 
 
The overall effect of stronger action binding following a negative outcome was found to 
be significant: Mean (SE) Gav = 0.24 (0.14), z-test = 1.76, p = 0.039, 95% CI = [0.02 0.47]. 
There was no evidence for any heterogeneity in the results, beyond what would be 
expected by chance: Q(5) = .76, p > .1. 
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6.4. Discussion  
 
This analysis compared the results of six studies, each measuring intentional (action) 
binding within a reversal learning paradigm. The effect of interest was an increase in 
action binding following a negative outcome. Effect sizes were calculated and compared 
across experiments to determine the strength of this sequential effect.  
The overall impression is of a small but reliable effect in the predicted direction i.e. an 
increase in action binding following negative outcomes. The overall effect size was 
significantly higher than zero, indicating that when all relevant studies were considered, 
there was robust statistical support for the effect described. Furthermore, the effect size 
confidence intervals suggest the effect is noisy, but reliable. Intervals were relatively 
large, but unimodal, skewed above zero and with very few outliers.  
Meta-analysis has its origins in the systematic appraisal of clinical trials. As such, the 
recommended methods do not necessarily transfer neatly to experimental settings such 
as those described in this work. In ideal circumstances, meta-analysis includes several 
large studies all using a common intervention with a precise measurable outcome. In 
contrast, the experimental psychology literature comprises many low-powered studies. 
Variations in equipment, attention, personality and experimenter technique may 
influence effect size.  
The analysis of heterogeneity indicated that the results obtained were highly 
homogenous. This was unsurprising given that all included studies were conducted by 
or in collaboration with the author, using the same experimental software and generally 
adhering to the same experimental protocol. Furthermore, although the participant 
samples were balanced for gender, and diverse in terms of age and ethnicity, all 
147 
 
participants were recruited from the same subject pool.  This degree of homogeneity 
was beneficial for confidence in inter-study comparison, but limits the generalizability 
of findings. This limitation is not comprehensively addressed in this thesis, however 
data from older participants and patients groups are presented and discussed in 
chapters 2, 3 and 7. 
The meaning and significance of the post–error boost to action binding has been 
discussed in previous chapters. The purpose of this chapter was to provide evidence 
that the observed trend from several low-powered studies was robust to a systematic 
inter-study analysis. The results show in a quantitative manner that the effect is reliable 
and therefore suitable for making further experimental predictions.  
It is unknown which cognitive and physiological mechanisms underpin the post-error 
boost. Experiment 6 provided evidence which suggests that it arises in contexts where 
monitoring outcomes is critical in learning what to do next. However it remains unclear 
whether the post-error agency boost is a marker of learning processes specifically and 
not simply a phenomenon that arises when one is engaged in goal-based decision-
making.  
The following chapter will describe results obtained from a PD patient group and age-
matched healthy controls, using the novel paradigm described here.  
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Chapter 7: Sense of agency and learning in Parkinson’s disease 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Learning to select actions based on outcomes is a core cognitive capacity.  Impaired 
learning and impulse control are features of Parkinson’s disease (PD) that often result 
in poor performance in goal-based decision-making tasks. The role of agency in this 
context is poorly understood. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 describe a reliable post-error agency boost in young healthy 
volunteers following negative outcomes. In experiment 7, the novel paradigm described 
in chapter 4 was used once again. Participants were PD Patients on medication and 
healthy age-matched controls.  
7.2. Experiment 9: Sense of agency and learning in Parkinson’s 
disease 
7.2.1. Introduction 
 
General time perception deficits in PD are described in the introduction to this thesis 
(section 1.3.9.) and in chapters 2 and 3. Relevant to this experiment, it was shown in 
experiments 1, 2 and 3 that PD patients performed with similar precision in a Libet task 
to healthy controls. However, intentional binding is a measure in the shift in time 
perception from one condition to another.  
Moore et al. (2010) found that patients OFF medication gave temporal judgements 
similar to healthy controls in a binding task. However, binding in patients was 
significantly increased while ON medication compared to OFF medication.  
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This experiment compared the performance and time judgements of patients ON 
medication to those of healthy age-matched controls. Stronger action binding was 
expected in patients compared to controls, as a result of being ON medication. It was 
also predicted that patients would show degraded performance in the decision-making 
task, due to generally impaired learning. Finally, it was predicted that the post-error 
agency boost would be reduced in patients relative to healthy controls, as this effect 
appears to be strongly related to learning. 
7.2.2. Method 
 
Participants 
This study was approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee. All participants agreed 
to participate in the study and signed a consent form. They all reported normal or 
corrected to normal vision and hearing, and were paid a bonus contingent on 
performance in the task.  
Eighteen PD patients (6 female, all right-handed, mean age = 60 years, SD = 8.7) 
attending the movement disorders outpatient clinic at the University Hospital of 
Messina, Italy, agreed to participate and were included in the study.  
Inclusion criteria were: a diagnosis of PD according to the UK Parkinson’s Disease 
Society Brain Bank criteria; treatment and clinical condition stable for at least 4 weeks 
prior to the study.  
Exclusion criteria were: any major concurrent neurological or psychiatric disorders (no 
exclusions); or a score < 24 on the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA) (one 
exclusion); language comprehension abilities inadequate to understand the instructions 
of the task (one exclusion). We therefore analysed data from 16 patients.  
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Seventeen healthy, age-matched (50-80 years old) volunteers in both Messina and in 
London, who responded to an advertisement were also included in the study and served 
as control group. 
For all patients the following demographic and clinical data were collected: educational 
level, age at study entry, age at disease onset, disease duration, as well as levodopa and 
dopamine-agonist equivalent daily dose (LEDD) (Tomlinson et al., 2010). Degree of 
motor impairment was rated by means of the Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale 
part 3 motor examination (UPDRS-III). All patient were tested in their ‘‘best ON’’ state 
(the best motor state at peak effect after taking their usual medication dose). 
All patients underwent a neuropsychological assessment including: the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI), the Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale (HAM-A) and the Apathy 
Evaluation Scale (AES) to rate, respectively, depression, anxiety and apathy. The 
Questionnaire for Impulsive-compulsive Behaviour Disorders in Parkinson's disease 
(QUIP-RS) (Weintraub et al., 2012) was employed to evaluate the severity of ICB.  
The Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA) was employed to assess overall cognitive 
function; digit span forward and backward for working memory; phonological word 
fluency and categorical word fluency for executive functions and language; Matrix 
Cancellation Features Target (MCFT) for selective visual attention.  
All clinical instruments are included in Appendix I. 
Procedure 
Materials and general procedure were as in experiment 4. 
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Baseline conditions were as in experiment 4 and were repeated at the end of the 
experiment. 
Operant conditions were based on experiment 4, however reversals occurred after a 
variable number of trials (randomly either 8, 10 or 12 trials), as in experiment 6. 
Given specific predictions based on previous work, only action binding was recorded.  
Analysis 
Judgement errors in baseline blocks and binding in operant blocks were calculated as in 
experiments 4-8. 
A measure of perseveration was also taken, defined as the frequency of trials in which 
the participant switched keys (relative to the previous trial). A tendency to perseverate 
would therefore reveal itself in low rates of switching across the experiment. 
7.2.3. Results 
 
Clinical data of the PD population are shown in table 7-1. 
Patient ID UPDRS-III QUIP-RS BDI HAM-A AES MOCA 
P_01 10 0 4 4 4 28 
P_02 6 26 4 9 5 29 
P_03 34 0 8 14 10 30 
P_04 17 0 15 4 11 27 
P_06 11 0 6 6 4 30 
P_07 20 0 8 0 0 25 
P_08 28 0 12 8 12 26 
P_10 8 3 2 3 4 28 
P_11 14 12 17 19 15 24 
P_12 9 0 10 17 18 28 
P_13 19 28 5 4 9 27 
P_14 31 0 7 11 15 26 
P_15 13 12 8 7 9 25 
P_16 21 0 1 4 12 25 
P_17 12 0 0 2 4 27 
P_18 17 11 5 12 20 24 
 
Table 7-1: clinical data from patients in experiment 9. 
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Performance 
All participants learned the action-outcome contingencies. Reversal events were 
predictably followed by more errors, but both patients and healthy controls returned to 
better-than chance performance within a few trials (see figure 7-1).  
For each participant, a performance score was calculated, defined as the ratio of error 
trials to non-error trials across the experiment. An independent samples t-test of these 
ratios showed that patients chose the non-rewarded key more often than controls 
(patients: M = 1.00, SD = .11, controls: M = .83, SD = .13; t(31) = 4.17, p < .001) 
Action Binding 
Action binding results were submitted to a 2x2 mixed ANOVA with a between-subjects 
factor of group (PD or controls) and a within-subjects factor of outcome on the previous 
trial (rewarded or penalised). There was no main effect of group (F(1,31) = 2.01, p = .166, 
 = .061) and no main effect of previous outcome (F(1,31) = .064, p = .802,  = .002). 
However there was a significant interaction (F(1,31) = 5.693, p = 0.023,  = .155) (see 
figure 7-1).  To explore the interaction, binding following a positive outcome was 
subtracted from binding following a negative outcome. The result is a measure of the 
post-error action boost. Healthy participants showed significantly more of this boost 
than patients (t(31) = 2.386, p = .023).  Indeed, the normal pattern of increased binding 
following error was reversed in the patient group. 
An independent-samples t-test of switching frequency revealed no effect of group (t(31) 
= -1.637, p = .112). There is therefore no evidence that patients were more likely to 
perseverate actions than healthy controls. 
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Figure 7-1: Action binding in experiment 9. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
Modelling & learning rate analysis  
A modelling and learning rate analysis was conducted as in chapter 4 (section 4.5.). 
It was predicted that patients would not show the same boost to action binding 
observed in previous studies with healthy participants.  
Data and model are shown in figure 7-2.  
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Figure 7-2: Proportion of correct responses before and after a reversal event for patients and healthy 
controls. The continuous line represents patient data and individual vertical markers represent predictions 
of the reinforcement-learning model. 
 
To determine if patients and controls displayed differences in learning, the asymmetric 
learning rates α+ and α- were submitted to a mixed ANOVA with a between-subjects 
factor of group (patient/control) and a within-subjects factor of prediction error sign 
(positive/ negative).  
There was a main effect of group (F(1,32) = 8.41, p = .007, = .213), with controls using 
prediction errors to update their preferences more than patients. We also found a main 
effect of prediction error sign (F(1,32) = 21.75, p = .000,  = .412). All participants were 
more influenced by positive than negative prediction errors when updating action 
preferences. Finally, there was a significant interaction (F(1,32) = 5.6, p = .024,  = .153) 
(see figure 7-3). Simple effects t-tests showed that patients were significantly less likely 
than controls to update preferences following negative prediction errors (t(31) = 3.44, p 
= .002) but not positive outcomes (t(31) = .28, p = .97) . 
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Figure 7-3: Learning rates for patients and controls. The values α+ and α- represent, respectively, the degree 
to which action preferences are updated following a positive or negative prediction error. 
 
7.2.4. Discussion 
 
Parkinson’s disease patients on medication and age-matched healthy controls both 
completed a reversal-learning task with an embedded intentional binding measure. 
Both groups demonstrated an ability to obtain reward through action selection, 
although the patient group performed worse overall. A simple reinforcement-learning 
model showed that patients and controls updated action preferences in response to 
positive prediction errors. However, the learning rate from negative prediction errors 
was reduced in patients relative to controls. 
Chronometric measures of the perceived time of action obtained during the task were 
examined for intentional binding effects, and specifically the tendency for the perceived 
time of an action to shift towards the corresponding outcome. For healthy controls only, 
trials following an error showed greater action binding than trials following a success, 
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suggesting a post-error agency boost.  Patients with PD showed neither an overall 
action binding effect, nor a post-error agency boost. 
A previous study (Moore et al., 2010) reported stronger intentional binding in a small 
sample of PD patients ON medication than in healthy controls. This effect was not 
replicated here.  However, the result of Moore and colleagues could be interpreted as a 
drug effect, rather than a disease effect, since PD patients OFF medication did not differ 
from the control group. Further, their effect depended on outcome binding as well as 
action binding, and outcome binding was not measured in this study. 
Crucially, the post-error agency boost was reduced in the PD group, as shown by a 
significant ANOVA interaction between group and previous outcome.  Thus, the patients’ 
performance in the probabilistic learning task was characterised by alterations of 
behavioural adaptation, and also of subjective experience.  First, the PD patients used 
negative prediction errors significantly less than controls when updating action choice 
preferences. Second, they showed reduced action binding following such errors, relative 
to healthy volunteers. The results suggest that these deficits may be linked.  
A diminished capacity to learn from environmental cues may be a reason for the 
absence of a PEAB in the patient group. In this sense, patients may be likened to 
participants in the difficult condition of experiment 5, who also did not show increased 
binding after an error. The observed lack of a PEAB in this experiment is therefore 
particularly interesting, as it points to a hitherto unknown effect of cognitive 
impairments on the subjective experience of voluntary actions. Impulsivity in PD may 
short-circuit meaningful engagement in risky choice tasks, such that errors are not 
appreciated as valuable information and do not trigger an agency boost. Interestingly, 
research shows that SoA is inherently rewarding (Karsh & Eitam, 2015). Reduced SoA 
157 
 
might then partially account for known motivational deficits in PD, such as apathy and 
depression. Future experimental work with adequate sample sizes could determine if 
these aspects of the pathology are indeed linked.  
These results add to previous experimental results indicating cognitive deficits in 
Parkinson’s disease. Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins (2001) found that patients 
performed worse in a task-switching paradigm when medication was withdrawn. 
Interestingly, they found the opposite effect when patients completed a reversal-
learning task similar to the paradigm reported here. Performance was worse when 
patients were medicated (as observed here). These combined results support the 
theory that an increase in dopamine has a differential effect on cognitive functions that 
may depend on the activation of separate areas of the prefrontal cortex (Gotham et al., 
1988; Swainson, 2000). Since patients in experiment 9 were tested only ON medication, 
the separate contributions of dopamine-depleting disease, and dopaminergic 
medication cannot be adequately determined. 
The diminished ability to update preferences following errors observed here was 
associated with, indeed may be the cause of, a reduction SoA. These data therefore 
extend the findings of Cools et al. (2001), Swainson (2000) and other researchers by 
providing evidence for a subjective experience that accompanies deficits in cognitive 
processes in Parkinson’s disease. 
As an alternative explanation for the absent post-error boost in patients, the influence 
of action perseveration was also considered. If patients perseverated their actions more 
than healthy controls, this could potentially have produced an attentional bias towards 
actions rather than the outcomes they produced. However, there was no statistically 
significant increase in perseveration in patients. 
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Another possible explanation for the post-error SoA boost is an attempt to reassert 
control following an error. Cognitive processes that follow detrimental outcomes 
include post-error slowing (PES) (Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011). Botvinick et al. 
(2001) suggested that PES might occur due to strategic adjustments and increased 
caution in responding. As such, one would expect deficits in strategic adjustment in 
groups such as Parkinson’s, where cognitive control is impaired.  
The learning bias observed here could be driven by pathology, or by the influence of 
dopamine through medication. The patient group in this experiment was remarkably 
homogenous in terms of disease severity and levels of dopaminergic medication. This 
would need to be investigated in a potential future study testing patients both ON and 
OFF medication.  
7.3. General conclusions from experiment 9 
 
Patients experience a reduced SoA in response to negative outcomes in goal-based 
learning compared to healthy controls. This effect is not a consequence of action 
perseveration, but may be due to the diminished influence of negative prediction errors 
on learning in Parkinson’s disease.  
The data obtained in chapter 7 complement and expand on the results presented in 
chapters 2 and 3. The combined results describe the subjective experience of voluntary 
actions in PD and how this experience is used to guide future actions. 
 Results from all chapters are considered in the following general discussion. 
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Chapter 8: General Discussion 
8.1. Summary of experimental work in this thesis 
 
This thesis explored human voluntary actions in health and disease. Distinct from 
reflexes and other automatic movements, voluntary actions are accompanied by a 
unique subjective experience. This experience, volition, provides what Shadlen calls the 
‘freedom from immediacy’ (Shadlen & Gold, 2004). Further, voluntary actions are a 
critical component of the sense of agency (SoA), the feeling that we control our actions, 
and thereby influence changes in the outside world.  
The work presented here attempted to further research in the fields of motor control 
and action awareness with two specific aims:  
Firstly, the subjective experience of volition in Parkinson’s disease was investigated by 
comparing cognitive and neurophysiological measures of volition within the same 
patients while OFF and ON two symptom-alleviating interventions.  
Secondly, a new paradigm investigating the SoA was introduced, tested and evaluated. 
This paradigm combined an implicit measure of agency with a goal-based decision-
making task, in order to provide an ecologically valid context in which participants 
could make actions for a reason. 
In nine experiments, mental chronometry was used as means of determining awareness 
of intentions and actions. The Libet paradigm (Libet et al., 1983), intentional binding 
(Haggard, Clark and Kalogeras, 2002) and reversal learning tasks (Rolls, 1999; Cools, 
Clark, Owen & Robbins, 2002) were used to investigate the specific factors that 
influence the subjective experience of volition and agency. Electroencephalography 
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(EEG) was used to examine the neural processes thought to underlie volition, both in 
healthy participants and in PD patients. A meta-analysis was used to evaluate the 
strength of the effects obtained using the novel paradigm introduced in chapter 4. The 
findings of these experiments are discussed below. 
8.2. Volition in Parkinson’s disease 
Experiment 1 showed that PD patients were able to adequately complete a Libet task 
without any diminished precision relative to healthy controls. Interestingly, these 
results differed from Tabu et al. (2015), who found delayed awareness of intentions in 
PD. 
Increasing DA availability through dopaminergic medication resulted in earlier 
judgements of both action and action intention awareness in PD patients. Alleviation of 
DA-related symptoms by DBS did not appear to have the same effect. The ‘dopamine 
overdose hypothesis’ (Vaillancourt et al., 2013), suggests that earlier judgements may 
have arisen from patients being in a hyper-dopaminergic state.  
Interestingly, while medication and DBS implicate different neural mechanisms, a 
follow-up analysis showed that their common functional impact might have driven 
earlier judgements in the Libet task. A direct comparison of data from experiments 1 
and 2 showed that there was a significant effect of being ON intervention, which did not 
interact with the specific type of intervention. 
Interpreting the results of experiments 2 and 3 using a threshold model would suggest 
that rate change in the accumulation of motor evidence was not a convincing 
explanation for earlier awareness of actions and intentions observed while patients 
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were ON intervention. Rate change would have manifested as a steeper or shallower 
accumulation curve, resulting in a larger or smaller gap between intention and action 
awareness. However the results of chapter 2 showed that these timing judgements 
moved together, so the ‘intention-action gap’ remained constant. 
Experiment 3 provided neurological evidence that the observed changes in intention 
and action awareness may be due to an earlier onset to the readiness potential, and/or 
a lowering of perceptual thresholds.  Furthermore, an analysis of the variability of 
amplitude within individual trials suggested that prior to action onset, there was a more 
marked drop in variability in patients ON intervention than patients OFF intervention. 
One potential explanation is that while ON intervention, the motor preparation 
environment may become more efficient (earlier onset) and less noisy (lowered 
thresholds). These remarks are made with caution however, as the behavioural effect in 
question was not detected in experiment 3.  
Taken together, chapters 2 and 3 provide insight into the neural context in which PD 
patients generate voluntary actions. The features of this neural context may be 
associated with earlier perception of intentions and actions when patients are under the 
influence of symptom-alleviating interventions. 
8.3. Sense of Agency: a novel paradigm 
Chapter 4 introduced a novel paradigm in which participants were required to learn 
relations between actions and outcomes. Intentional binding measures were embedded 
in the task to show how outcomes influence the sense of agency in a dynamic learning 
environment. This paradigm is seemingly the first to combine techniques from decision-
making and motor control research. 
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Results from several experiments showed that participants were able to complete the 
task with an appreciation of how their decisions could benefit them. The paradigm 
therefore represents a useful tool with which to derive implicit measures of agency in a 
controlled environment where actions have meaning. 
The novel paradigm also allowed features of the choice environment to be manipulated, 
in order to examine their individual effects. Over three experiments, difficulty was 
manipulated by adjusting the predictability of outcomes. In experiment 6, difficulty was 
rendered irrelevant altogether in one condition, in which outcomes occurred at random 
and learning was impossible. The ability to learn proved to be a critical factor in the 
emergence of a boost to action binding following negative feedback (discussed in the 
following section).  
In experiment 5, the post-error boost was not detected in versions of the task that were 
made considerably easier, or considerably more difficult. This pattern of results 
suggests that a learning context alone is insufficient to give rise to the effect. Rather, it 
may be critical that participants feel that they are able to adequately detect shifting 
patterns of probability, without these patterns becoming too predictable. The 
parameters of experiments 4 and 6 might represent a degree of difficulty that induces 
engagement in the learning aspect of the task without being either too discouraging or 
too repetitive. This cognitive engagement may be the critical ingredient that gives rise 
to the PEAB. 
Contrary to previous work using valenced outcomes in a binding task (Takahata et al., 
2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013), experiment 4 found an increase in outcome binding on 
trials with negative outcomes. Outcome binding was not explored further in this thesis, 
however the most obvious difference between experiment 4 and the cited work is the 
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ability to learn from one trial to the next. Future experimental research may therefore 
test whether the ability to learn may influence the effect of valenced outcomes on 
different components of intentional binding.  
8.4. Sense of Agency: Post-error Action boost 
The experimental results of chapters 4 and 5 showed that actions following negative 
feedback were more temporally bound towards their outcomes than actions following 
positive feedback. This effect suggests that when people experience negative outcomes, 
they feel more control, not less, when they make subsequent related actions.  
Research previously suggested that binding is insensitive to action-outcome 
relationships (Desantis, Hughes, & Waszak, 2012). Evidence for the reliability of the 
post-error action boost (PEAB) was therefore obtained using statistical meta-analysis in 
chapter 6. The effect proved robust, and emerged as a small, but consistent effect across 
the included studies. 
The PEAB may seem counterintuitive, however the experimental design encouraged 
participants to make actions in pursuit of goals, and evaluate whether their actions 
were successful or not. An analysis of learning rates in experiments 4 and 6 confirmed 
that participants did engage with the task in this way. Negative feedback might have 
increased participants’ feeling of agency for a short time to facilitate learning. It was 
through failures that participants learned to act appropriately in the future.  
Intentional binding is a proxy measure of agency, so results must always be interpreted 
with caution. Binding may be influenced by factors other than SoA. Most alternative 
theories propose that binding merely represents an appreciation of causation generally 
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(Buehner & Humphreys, 2009; Buehner (2012), Cravo, Craessens, & Baldo, 2009; Cravo, 
Craessens, and Baldo, 2011). However, the experimental designs presented in this work 
always compared data between critical conditions, in order to isolate individual 
influences on binding measures. The emergence of the PEAB is difficult to reconcile with 
theories of general causation, as causation is presumably equivalent regardless of the 
type of outcome. However, inferring agency from binding always remains a critical 
assumption and must be acknowledged as such.  
Interpreting the PEAB in the context of learning and decision-making is also inherently 
limited by the methods used. The timescales used in Libet tasks are short, typically less 
than a second, and therefore preclude strong assertions about decision-making over 
longer timescales. Choosing which button to press in an experimental task cannot be 
easily compared to selecting an appropriate outfit or buying a home.   
Nevertheless, the findings presented here are noteworthy for two reasons. Firstly, the 
PEAB was proven to be reliable and replicable. Future experimental work on sense of 
agency, learning, causation and decision-making can therefore make use of this effect in 
experimental design. The PEAB is ideally suited to provide an index of engagement in 
learning tasks, alongside other currently used metrics such as performance data and 
eye-tracking.  
Secondly, these results offer, seemingly for the first time, an explanation of why agency 
manifests. Agency research has hitherto been preoccupied with establishing reliable 
measures and defining putative mechanisms (Haggard, 2017). However, the present 
work suggests that SoA might support the motivation to improve performance. The 
brain appears to house a cognitive/experiential mechanism that ensures occasional 
failures do not immediately prevent further exploration. Indeed, SoA appears to 
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increase precisely when cognitive engagement is required to distinguish incidental 
failures from systematically detrimental outcomes. Experiments in this thesis therefore 
break new ground in linking the subjective experience of agency to the cognitive 
mechanisms of reinforcement learning, and thereby offering a reason why agency 
should exist at all. 
8.5. Sense of Agency in Parkinson’s disease 
Chapter 7 investigated the PEAB in a PD population ON medication. The known 
cognitive deficits of PD (deVos et al., 1996; Weintraub, David, Evans, Grant, & Stacy, 
2015) were expected to influence the learning-related effect seen in healthy 
participants. 
In experiment 9, PD patients, unlike healthy controls, did not show a PEAB. Analysis of 
choice behaviour showed that this effect was not simply a consequence of action 
perseveration. Rather, a learning rate analysis demonstrated that a reduced PEAB in 
patients might be attributable to a lesser influence of negative prediction errors on 
learning, compared to controls.  
This experiment further validated the use of the novel paradigm, while expanding on 
the data obtained in chapters 2 & 3. The combined results provide greater perspective 
on the perception of voluntary actions in Parkinson’s disease, including how the 
outcomes of such actions might be evaluated.  
8.6. Further directions 
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A comprehensive understanding of voluntary actions in PD remains elusive. More 
research is required to determine the influence and interactions of therapeutic 
interventions, comorbid cognitive deficits and other factors, such as age, on the 
subjective experience of making and monitoring voluntary actions in PD. The effects 
described in this thesis require replication in larger subject groups, to more adequately 
assess effect size and robustness. 
The post-error action boost is inextricably linked to voluntary actions, yet the precise 
neural underpinnings of agency are still unclear, particularly in a more complex 
decision-making environment. The novel paradigm presented here has proven itself as 
a reliable cognitive task that can be readily modified. It might therefore be used to 
design experiments that elicit a post-error action boost with a view to measuring the 
spatial and temporal nature of neural activity in the premotor cortex and beyond. 
8.7. Conclusions 
This thesis examined the subjective experience of initiating and monitoring voluntary 
actions in health and disease. Nine experiments and a meta-analysis investigated 
changes in time perception that reflect underlying cognitive and neurological processes. 
The use of patient groups, electrophysiology and a novel behavioural paradigm led to 
new insights being discovered, replicated and evaluated. 
This work has described mechanisms that contribute to learning in humans, both in 
health and disease. When faced with unexpected outcomes, the brain ensures that 
learning persists and informs our goal-directed movements. When physical movement 
is impaired, the use of symptom-alleviating interventions appears to influence not only 
motor function, but the subjective experience that accompanies purposeful actions. 
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This thesis represents a convergence of several research topics for the first time. The 
experience of voluntary actions was found to be associated with dopaminergic drives in 
the premotor cortex, and the sense of agency was investigated in the context of learning 
and decision-making. These convergences represent fruitful avenues of investigation for 
future research on motor control, voluntary actions, decision-making and movement-
related pathology and treatment. 
The overall picture is one of adaptability: as humans we use learning to refine and 
adjust our behaviour. The work presented here highlights the role of voluntary actions 
in learning to adapt. Ultimately, it is this ability to respond intelligently to rapidly 
changing environments that has ensured the on-going evolution of human society and 
the continued development of the manmade world. 
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9. Appendices 
9.1 Appendix I: clinical instruments used in chapters 2, 3 and 7. 
 
9-1 Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale Part 3 motor examination 
(UPDRS-III) 
9-2 Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MOCA) 
9-3  Questionnaire for Impulsive-compulsive Behaviour Disorders in 
Parkinson's disease (QUIP-RS) 
9-4  Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) 
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Figure 9-1 :  Unified Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale Part 3 motor examination (UPDRS-III) 
 
18. Speech  
0 = Normal.  
1 = Slight loss of expression, diction and/or volume.  
2 = Monotone, slurred but understandable; moderately impaired.  
3 = Marked impairment, difficult to understand.  
4 = Unintelligible.  
 
19. Facial Expression  
0 = Normal.  
1 = Minimal hypomimia, could be normal "Poker Face".  
2 = Slight but definitely abnormal diminution of facial expression  
3 = Moderate hypomimia; lips parted some of the time.  
4 = Masked or fixed facies with severe or complete loss of facial expression; lips parted 1/4 inch or more.  
 
20. Tremor at rest (head, upper and lower extremities)  
0 = Absent.  
1 = Slight and infrequently present.  
2 = Mild in amplitude and persistent. Or moderate in amplitude, but only intermittently present.  
3 = Moderate in amplitude and present most of the time.  
4 = Marked in amplitude and present most of the time. 
 
21. Action or Postural Tremor of hands  
0 = Absent.  
1 = Slight; present with action.  
2 = Moderate in amplitude, present with action.  
3 = Moderate in amplitude with posture holding as well as action.  
4 = Marked in amplitude; interferes with feeding.  
 
22. Rigidity (Judged on passive movement of major joints with patient relaxed in sitting 
position. Cogwheeling to be ignored.)  
0 = Absent.  
1 = Slight or detectable only when activated by mirror or other movements.  
2 = Mild to moderate.  
3 = Marked, but full range of motion easily achieved.  
4 = Severe, range of motion achieved with difficulty. 
 
23. Finger Taps (Patient taps thumb with index finger in rapid succession.)  
0 = Normal.  
1 = Mild slowing and/or reduction in amplitude.  
2 = Moderately impaired. Definite and early fatiguing. May have occasional arrests in movement.  
3 = Severely impaired. Frequent hesitation in initiating movements or arrests in ongoing movement.  
4 = Can barely perform the task. 
 
24. Hand Movements (Patient opens and closes hands in rapid succesion.)  
0 = Normal.  
1 = Mild slowing and/or reduction in amplitude.  
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2 = Moderately impaired. Definite and early fatiguing. May have occasional arrests in movement.  
3 = Severely impaired. Frequent hesitation in initiating movements or arrests in ongoing movement.  
4 = Can barely perform the task. 
 
25. Rapid Alternating Movements of Hands (Pronation-supination movements of hands, 
vertically and horizontally, with as large an amplitude as possible, both hands 
simultaneously.)  
0 = Normal.  
1 = Mild slowing and/or reduction in amplitude.  
2 = Moderately impaired. Definite and early fatiguing. May have occasional arrests in movement.  
3 = Severely impaired. Frequent hesitation in initiating movements or arrests in ongoing movement.  
4 = Can barely perform the task. 
 
26. Leg Agility (Patient taps heel on the ground in rapid succession picking up entire leg. 
Amplitude should be at least 3 inches.)  
0 = Normal.  
1 = Mild slowing and/or reduction in amplitude.  
2 = Moderately impaired. Definite and early fatiguing. May have occasional arrests in movement.  
3 = Severely impaired. Frequent hesitation in initiating movements or arrests in ongoing movement.  
4 = Can barely perform the task. 
 
27. Arising from Chair (Patient attempts to rise from a straightbacked chair, with arms 
folded across chest.)  
0 = Normal.  
1 = Slow; or may need more than one attempt.  
2 = Pushes self up from arms of seat.  
3 = Tends to fall back and may have to try more than one time, but can get up without help.  
4 = Unable to arise without help. 
 
28. Posture  
0 = Normal erect.  
1 = Not quite erect, slightly stooped posture; could be normal for older person.  
2 = Moderately stooped posture, definitely abnormal; can be slightly leaning to one side.  
3 = Severely stooped posture with kyphosis; can be moderately leaning to one side.  
4 = Marked flexion with extreme abnormality of posture.  
 
29. Gait  
0 = Normal.  
1 = Walks slowly, may shuffle with short steps, but no festination (hastening steps) or propulsion.  
2 = Walks with difficulty, but requires little or no assistance; may have some festination, short steps, or 
propulsion.  
3 = Severe disturbance of gait, requiring assistance.  
4 = Cannot walk at all, even with assistance.  
 
30. Postural Stability (Response to sudden, strong posterior displacement - pull on 
shoulders while patient erect with eyes open and feet slightly apart. Patient is 
prepared.)  
0 = Normal.  
1 = Retropulsion, but recovers unaided.  
2 = Absence of postural response; would fall if not caught by examiner.  
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3 = Very unstable, tends to lose balance spontaneously.  
4 = Unable to stand without assistance.  
 
31. Body Bradykinesia and Hypokinesia (Combining slowness, hesitancy, decreased 
armswing, small amplitude, and poverty of movement in general.)  
0 = None.  
1 = Minimal slowness, giving movement a deliberate character; could be normal for some persons. Possibly 
reduced amplitude.  
2 = Mild degree of slowness and poverty of movement which is definitely abnormal. Alternatively, some 
reduced amplitude.  
3 = Moderate slowness, poverty or small amplitude of movement.  
4 = Marked slowness, poverty or small amplitude of movement.  
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Figure 9-2:  Montreal Cognitive Assessment 
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Figure 9-3: Questionnaire for Impulsive-compulsive Behaviour Disorders in PD (QUIP-RS) 
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Figure 9-4:  Beck’s Depression Inventory 
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9.2 Appendix II 
 
Figure 9-5 : Observed 6 Hz artefact from DBS stimulator device in experiment 3 
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